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Abstract
The nature of action and reaction that forms the basis for terrorist – government
interactions creates a dynamic system. Understanding how this dynamic system behaves
in response to key government activities can help the government better control the
overall behavior of the system. The system dynamics methodology is one tool that can
help the government solve specific behavioral problems within the overall system.
This research shows the ability of system dynamics to help develop government
policy towards terrorism that can directly affect a terrorist’s behavior. It supports a
government policy of offensive action instead of defensive reaction. It also identifies the
primary variables and parameters of the overall system at an aggregated level. This
research effort is the genesis of a future research stream capable of helping the
government manages their terrorism policy. The last chapter of this study suggests
additional steps in this line of research to develop a tool that can help the government
control the dynamic system of terrorist–government interactions.

xv

UNDERSTANDING THE DYNAMIC SYSTEM OF
TERRORIST – GOVERNMENT INTERACTION

I. Introduction

The September 11th 2001 attacks against the United States of America highlighted
America’s vulnerability to hostile terrorist actions within the nation’s borders. The
attacks also demonstrated the speed and lethal capability of modern global and regional
terrorist organizations. For the U.S. government to effectively respond to these threats, it
must develop a better understanding of the dynamic system formed by the interactions
between it and terrorist organizations.
1.1 Background
The attacks of September 11th have changed the face of U.S. national security. To
quote Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld (2002:22-23),
During the Cold War, we faced a fairly predictable set of threats. We
knew a good deal about our adversary and its capabilities, and we
fashioned the strategies and capabilities needed to deter them. And we
were successful. … As we painfully learned on September 11, the
challenges of the new century are not nearly as predictable as were those
of the last. Who would have imagined, only a few months ago, that
terrorists would take commercial airliners, turn them into missiles, and use
them to strike the Pentagon and the World Trade Center, killing
thousands? In the years ahead, we will probably be surprised again by
new adversaries who may strike in unexpected ways.
As pointed out by Secretary Rumsfeld, one of the United States’ new enemies is terrorist
groups that threaten it and its interests with unconventional warfare and terrorism.
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The rally cry for U.S. efforts against this new threat of terrorism was the events of
September 11th, which dramatically changed the American public’s perception of
homeland security. However, the threat of terrorism to the U.S. is not new; in fact, it
started well before the end of the Cold War and has increased significantly since the fall
of the Soviet Union. To understand the threat of terrorism, it is important to define
terrorism, review the relevant history of traditional terrorism, identify the significant
factors in the evolution of modern terrorism, identify modern government
counterterrorism operations, and recognize the system behaviors created by the
interactions between the government and modern terrorist organizations.
1.1.1 Definition of Terrorism. In its most basic form, terrorism is about
affecting some type of change in the society to which the terrorist organization belongs.
The spectrum of change can vary greatly; it may be greater autonomy for a specific
ethnic group, a change in political leadership or form of government, the creation of a
separate nation for the oppressed group, or the complete destruction of a target nation or
culture (Hoffman, 1998:45-129). Although a major tool for affecting this change is
public relations via violence, a mismanaged public relations campaign can lead to public
outrage and adverse governmental and international reprisals (Hoffman, 1998:155). Over
the years, the concept of terrorism has developed a negative connotation; therefore, any
group identified as a terrorist organization will find it difficult to develop a positive
public relations campaign to accomplish its goals. Likewise, people and nations are less
likely to provide financial, technical, logistical, or other types of support to organizations
that are considered terrorists (Hoffman, 1998:30-31).
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Because of the importance of public relations, at the heart of the problem of
defining terrorism is one’s point of view (Hoffman, 1998:31). If a person or nation
supports the social status quo, then they normally label those who want to change that
status quo via some violent method to be a terrorist. However, if a person or nation does
not support the social status quo, then they normally label those who want to change the
status quo as freedom fighters, revolutionaries, or some other socially acceptable name;
furthermore, they also claim that the only methods available for these individuals to
affect the desired social change is via violence (Hoffman, 1998:31).
In fact, many authors claim that the words terror, terrorism, and terrorist have
been so widely used and applied that there is no true consensus regarding their exact
meaning (e.g., Hoffman, 1998; Quillen, 2002a; Howard and Sawyer, 2002). For instance,
Hoffman (1998) and Howard and Sawyer (2002a) dedicated the entire first chapter of
their books on terrorism to reviewing the problem of defining it. Quillen (2002a:281)
probably summarizes this dichotomy best in stating, “Far too many trees have been slain
and far too much ink spilled already debating the exact definition of terrorism.” A classic
example of this problem was the attempt by the United Nations (UN) to internationally
define and take a stand on terrorism following the 1972 terrorist attack at the Munich
Olympics. However, the UN reached an impasse between the Western powers and
several third world countries who saw terrorism as the only possible way for many small
revolutionary movements and small countries to combat the military might of the
established national and/or world powers (Hoffman, 1998:31-32).
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Despite this lack of consensus regarding a definition for terrorism, this research
effort needs a definition to provide a context for its results. Therefore, the U.S.
Department of Defense definition of terrorism will be used:
the unlawful use of–or threatened use of–force or violence against
individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies,
often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives. (Hoffman
1998:38)
To better comprehend the difficulties in defining terrorism, it is necessary to add
another level of detail to our definition. Traditionally, terrorist organizations act within a
specific geographical region to affect social change for a specific group of people. This
changed with the 1968 Palestinian hijacking of an El Al commercial flight from Rome to
Tel Aviv, an act which some experts claim was the birth of modern international
terrorism (Hoffman, 1998:67; Gunaratna, 2002:1). For the purpose of this research,
modern terrorism will be divided into three selected types: Domestic (or Traditional)
Terrorism, International Regional Terrorism, and International Global Terrorism. To
understand how these types were selected, it is useful to review the relevant history of
traditional terrorism and the evolution of modern terrorism
1.1.2 History of Traditional Terrorism. The use of violence as a mechanism for
change is not a new concept to humanity; terrorism has been around in one form or
another throughout human history. However, the origin of the word terror and its
association with violent political change are credited to the French Revolution (17871799). The French revolutionaries used a system of terror to round-up and punish
supporters of the French Monarchy and other parties considered to be a threat to the new
democracy. The standard method of punishment was beheading. Under this initial
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context, terrorism was seen as a necessary, if not positive, tool of the government to
establish the fledgling democracy (Hoffman, 1998:15).
Over the next 150 years, other European revolutionaries, constitutionalists,
anarchists and anti-establishment forces established the common association of terrorism
with anti-governmental forces. It was Carlos Pisacane who is credited for developing the
terrorism theory of “propaganda by deed” (Hoffman, 1998:17). However, it was the
Russian constitutionalist group called Narodnaya Volya that is credited with first
practicing ”propaganda by deed” with the double suicide bombing of Tsar Alexander II
(Hoffman, 1998:17-18). The European terrorists’ struggles against monarchies have been
credited for setting in motion the chain of events that started World War I (Hoffman,
1998:21).
In the 1930s and 1940s, the atrocities of Hitler and Stalin shifted the definition of
terrorism back to a tool of government, instead of anti-government forces, in order to
ruthlessly establish and maintain power (Hoffman, 1998:25). This was short lived
though, as three factors from World War II helped reshape the face of terrorism as a tool
of anti-government forces. First, Japan’s initial victories over European and American
forces in the Pacific theater proved that these colonial powers were not invincible
(Hoffman 1998:46). Second, the development of the Atlantic Charter in 1941 included
articles that affirmed the right of a populace to self-determination and a voice in
developing territorial boundaries (Hoffman, 1998:47). The third factor was the Jewish
Holocaust, which eventually led to postwar sympathy for the Jews and restoration of their
historical homeland (Hoffman, 1998:53-56). The resulting establishment of the Jewish
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state of Israel dislocated many Palestinians, a major factor in today’s Israeli-Palestinian
conflict and a significant source of today’s terrorism (Hoffman, 1998:69-71).
After World War II ended, many Western colonies expected to be freed from
colonial rule. When this did not happen, post-World War II anti-colonial terrorism began
to materialize (Hoffman 1998:25-26). It was during this timeframe that several Jewish
terrorist groups located in Palestine began attacking British colonial forces, with the
distinct goal of using violence to draw international public attention to their cause of
Jewish statehood (Hoffman, 1998:50-53). However, international sympathy for the Jews
as a result of the Holocaust created a politically correct environment in which Jewish
terrorists were referred to as “freedom fighters,” which represented a much more positive
connotation in the world of public relations (Howard and Sawyer, 2002:48).
The Jewish struggle, which was eventually supported by many American
politicians and the United Nations, demonstrated that terrorist activities are historically
defined by who won (Hoffman, 1998:54-56). Eqbal Ahmad, a major activist scholar,
often stated, “To begin with, terrorists change. The terrorist of yesterday is the hero of
today, and the hero of yesterday becomes the terrorist of today” (Howard and Sawyer
2002:48). To support this statement, Ahmad points out that at least two Israeli prime
ministers, including Menachem Begin, appeared in “Wanted” posters during the initial
Jewish struggles. He also points out that the same Afghan mujahideen ”freedom
fighters” praised by President Regan as allies against the “Evil Empire” of the Soviet
Union became members of the Taliban and the global terrorist organization Al Qaeda
(Howard and Sawyer, 2002:48).
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The Jewish terrorist model of the late 1940s affected the development of many
other anti-colonial terrorist groups, such as the Algerian-based National Liberation Front
(FLN) (Hoffman, 1998:56). In turn, the FLN had an effect on the development of later
ethno-nationalist terrorist groups, such as Yasser Arafat and the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO) (Hoffman, 1998:60). In similar fashion, the PLO became an
example for many of today’s terrorist groups (Hoffman 1998:75-80). Ironically then, an
argument can be made that former Jewish terrorist groups initiated an evolution of
terrorism that resulted in the anti-Israeli terrorists that plague Israel today.
1.1.3 Evolution of Modern Terrorism. From the outset of terrorism, the
majority of terrorist groups were geographically restricted in their motivations,
capabilities, and areas of operations. As previously stated though, the 1968 Palestinian
hijacking of an El Al commercial flight from Rome to Tel Aviv is considered by many to
be the birth of modern international terrorism (Hoffman, 1998:67; Gunaratna, 2002:1).
This hijacking was soon followed by the infamous 1972 Palestinian attack on the Israeli
Olympic athletes in Munich. These two events not only provided the global media
attention the Palestinians sought, they also started a trend in which terrorists began to
travel to other nations to execute attacks against their target audiences (Hoffman, 1998:68
and 71-73). This internationalization of terrorism is the primary difference between
modern terrorism and traditional terrorism.
The 35-year history of modern terrorism since 1968 has been an evolution of
motivation, weaponry, and support. However, the two most significant factors in this
evolution are the technological developments in the areas of modern communication and
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transportation and the emergence of more liberal democracies throughout the world.
These factors are briefly addressed below to establish a context for the overall document.
The historical fact is that the technological development of communications over
the 20th century has forever changed global human interactions. Even over the last 20 to
30 years, the development of real-time communications through phones, 24-hour news
reporting, and the Internet have revolutionized the amount and quality of information
people have at their discretion. This fact has not been lost on the terrorist community.
The ability of news organizations to report real-time news is important to terrorists
because it helps spread their desired message across the globe almost instantaneously and
fulfills the old adage that “a picture is worth a thousand words.” One does not have to
look any further then the events of September 11th to see this point. Besides providing
access to real-time media, developments in communications technology also provide
terrorists tools (e.g., secure satellite communications and the Internet) to enhance their
organizational effectiveness and capabilities (Medd and Goldstein, 1997:295).
Although 20th century changes in transportation technologies were not as drastic
as those in communications, they were just as significant. The most important area was
the development of commercial air travel, which allowed people to travel great distances
in hours as opposed to days or weeks. The use of aircraft and air travel in terrorist
activities is clear. In fact, since the 1968 El Al hijacking, commercial airliners have been
used as a target for hijackings and bombings (Hoffman, 1998:137 and 149) and more
recently as a weapon as demonstrated in the September 11th attacks (CNN.com, 2002:2).
In addition to the faster and more capable communications and transportation
technologies available to terrorists today, the emergence of liberal democracies around
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the world has provided terrorists an environment in which they can thrive. These
democracies, with greater emphasis on personal freedoms, guarantee individuals certain
rights and privileges. Therefore, terrorist groups are able to function in these democratic
societies with a certain amount of operational security for their activities. More
importantly, the government response to terrorism in a democracy, unlike that in a
monarchy or totalitarian government, is usually complicated by politics and bureaucratic
processes (Crenshaw, 2001:335; Hoffman, 2002:314).
1.1.4 Government Counterterrorism Operations. Governments started
developing their modern counterterrorism capabilities in the 1970s when the common
terrorist tactics were “events of duration,” such as hijackings and hostage taking. As
terrorism evolved, the terrorists utilized more conclusive methods, such as bombings and
assassinations, because they offered the counterterrorism forces less time to mount a
response (Medd and Goldstein, 1997:282-283). Since the late 1970s, most governments
have developed a multi-agency response within their own government (Veness,
2001:409). In more recent years, as highlighted by the response to September 11th
attacks, it has become growingly apparent that the disjointed responses of individual
nations has not been enough to counter the threat of terrorism; therefore, world
governments have started to cooperate in the battle against terrorism on a regional and
global level.
As governments begin to cooperate, it is important to understand that
counterterrorism actions can be divided into three categories: prevention, proactive
action, and post-event investigation. Prevention is classified as actions designed to detect
and overtly disrupt terrorist operations. Proactive action consists of covert intelligence
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gathering to interdict terrorist organizations and their operations. Post-event
investigation is the collection of evidence to identify and convict the individuals or
groups responsible for a terrorist action (Veness, 2001:413-414).
1.1.5 System Behaviors. These counterterrorism actions by governments
establish a system of interactions that are driven by the behaviors of both terrorists and
governments. To understand these interactions, it is important look at how the output of
one entity serves as an input for the other entity. The government is acting on what it
thinks or knows the terrorists are doing, while the terrorists are trying to identify where
the government is most susceptible to attack. The ensuing system formed by these
interactions is dynamic because each group is reacting to the actions of the other while
trying to obtain and/or maintain a distinct advantage over the other entity within the
system. This dynamic interaction is shown graphically in Figure 1.

Perceived
Terrorist Action

Government

Terrorist

Perceived
Government Action

Figure 1. Dynamic Interaction between Terrorism and Government
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Since social change is at the heart of a terrorist’s motivations, there are three
possible long-term outcomes for a terrorist group. The first possible outcome is that the
terrorists are successful in affecting the desired government and/or social change, as with
the Israeli terrorists in post-World War II Palestine (Hoffman, 1998:56). The second
possible outcome is that the terrorists continue their struggle until they are destroyed or
imprisoned, as with Narodnaya Volya (Hoffman, 1998:19). The final possible outcome
is that the terrorist organization realizes that their cause is not worth fighting for any
more, as with many leftist terrorist groups who suffered ideologically from the fall of the
Soviet Union (Hoffman, 1998: 83-84). Any true solution to terrorism is inherently longterm (Hoffman, 2002:314) and is outside the scope of this research. This study is not
concerned with the long-term effects of terrorism, but rather with the existing interactions
between governments and terrorists.

1.2 Thesis Problem Statement
From the previous description of interactions, it can be said that terrorist
organizations and the government form a cyclic system of action and reaction. A better
understating of this system and its basic structure will help the government manage the
terrorist–government interaction. Therefore, the problem statement for this research is,
“In order to effectively counter terrorism, the government must better understand the
dynamic system of interactions between itself and the terrorist at an aggregate level.”
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1.3 Objectives
Given this broad problem statement, the overall objective of this research is to
describe the underlying interactions comprising the terrorism–government system in
system dynamics terms. The more specific objectives are listed below.
1.3.1 Objective 1. Since terrorism is difficult to define, this study will attempt to
identify the primary interactions between terrorist organizations and the government by
iteratively disaggregating the model boundary.
1.3.2 Objective 2. This study will provide some insight into how the system
behaves and how changes to these primary interactions affect the modeled behavior.
1.4 Methodology – A Systems Dynamics Overview
System dynamics provides a methodology that allows one to develop and
understand the relationships within virtually any type of system. It has been applied in a
wide variety of settings; a few examples include the areas of business, human health, and
public policy (Sterman, 2000:41-42). In all cases, the use of system dynamics principles
is focused on describing the behavior of a system.
Systems dynamics is fundamentally interdisciplinary. Because we are
concerned with the behavior of complex systems, system dynamics is
grounded in the theory of nonlinear dynamics and feedback control
developed in mathematics, physics, and engineering. Because we apply
these tools to the behavior of humans as well as physical and technical
systems, system dynamics draws on cognitive and social psychology,
economics and other social sciences. (Sterman, 2000:4-5).
System dynamics is a practical modeling methodology often used to address a single
question within a complex system, thus allowing a more simplistic view of the overall
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system. In this approach, system dynamics iteratively adds layers of complexity on top
of the simplistic view until the appropriate level of detail has been reached.
1.5 Summary
The United States of America has entered a new phase of its history. The
physical boundaries, which have served to protect the U.S. from foreign attacks with few
exceptions, have been negated by the wonders of modern information and transportation
technologies. To better defend the American homeland, it is important for the U.S.
government to understand the aggregate-level terrorist and government activities that
provide significant insight to the dynamic system of terrorist–government interaction.
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II. Literature Review

The literature review conducted for this research is divided into four primary
areas. First, the concept of modern terrorism is expanded beyond the definitions
developed in Chapter I. Second, the actual threat created by modern terrorism is
addressed from a domestic, regional, and global perspective. Third, the manner in which
governments respond to terrorism is addressed. Fourth, system dynamics is examined in
relationship to conflict modeling and terrorism as a methodology for studying terrorist–
government interactions.

2.1 Types of Modern Terrorism
Terrorists have traditionally restricted their activities to a specific geographical
area with the goal of influencing change for a specific group of people within that area.
However, as stated in Chapter I, the 1968 Palestinian hijacking of an El Al commercial
flight demonstrated that advancements in technology allowed terrorists to expand their
areas of operations and influence, thus giving rise to modern international terrorism
(Hoffman, 1998:67; Gunaratna, 2002:1). This realization was reinforced by the
Palestinian attack on Israeli athletes during the 1972 Olympics in Munich, Germany.
These two terrorist events effectively confirmed that modern technologies were providing
terrorists with new opportunities resulting from increased capabilities (Hoffman, 1998:68
and 71-74). The way terrorist organizations capitalized on these opportunities served as
the primary means to categorize modern terrorist groups into three categories: Domestic
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(or Traditional) Terrorism, International Regional Terrorism, and International Global
Terrorism. A brief summary of these categories is provided in Table 1.

Table 1. Types of Modern Terrorism (FBI, 2002:1-3; Hoffman, 1998:45-129)
Type of
Terrorism

Organizational
Goals or
Objectives

Domestic
Terrorism

Domestic/
National

International
Regional
Terrorism

National or
Regional

International
Global
Terrorism

Regional or
Global

Primary
Primary
Geographical
Historical
Area of
Period
Operations
Domestic/
Pre-1968
National
(Many still
exist today)
Regional or
1970s –
Global
Present

Global

Post Cold
War - Present

Recent
Examples
Shining Path,
Abu Sayyaf
Real IRA,
Islamic
Resistance
Movement
(HAMAS)
Al Qaeda

2.1.1 Domestic Terrorism. Domestic terrorism is a term used by the U.S. to
describe terrorist activity within the nation’s borders. Under this description, the Federal
Bureau of Investigations (FBI) is assigned the responsibility for counterterrorism
operations to fight domestic terrorism, which is defined by the FBI as follows.
Domestic terrorism is the unlawful use, or threatened use, of force or
violence by a group or individual based and operating entirely within the
United States or its territories without foreign direction committed against
persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian
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population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social
objectives. (FBI, 1999:ii)
However, domestic terrorism for the purpose of this research is defined as terrorist groups
who have organizational goals and/or objectives that are limited to a domestic or national
level and have a primary geographical area of operations that is also limited to the
domestic or national. This definition, in many ways, is just a generic application of the
FBI definition on a global level.
In addition to the FBI’s responsibilities, the State Department is one of several
U.S. agencies responsible for monitoring terrorism outside the U.S. and maintains the
Designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list. Of the 35 groups currently on this
list, 13 fall into the domestic terrorism category (FBI, 2002:1-3). Of these 13 groups, 3
operate in Columbia; 2 each in the Philippines, Egypt, and Greece; and 1 each in Algeria,
Sir Lanka, Turkey, and Peru. Examples of these domestic terrorist organizations are the
Abu Sayyaf group (Philippines), 17 November (Greece), and Shining Path (Peru) (FBI,
2002:1-3).
Besides the 13 domestic groups on the State Department’s FTO list, several
domestic organizations within the U.S. have been identified as terrorists or linked to
terrorist acts (FBI, 1999:17-20). However, the FBI operates on a per incident basis and
the loose affiliation of most U.S. terrorist organizations prevents direct connection of the
organization to terrorist events unless the organization takes credit for the attack (FBI,
1999:17-20). Therefore, the FBI does not publish a list of these organizations. Instead,
they have divided these domestic terrorist groups into three categories: Right-Wing, LeftWing, and Special Interest. Of the known terrorist incidents in 1999, only the special
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interest groups, specifically the environmental terrorist groups, claimed responsibility for
their attacks (FBI, 1999:3-6). In fact, the FBI credited five domestic groups with terrorist
acts or links to terrorist acts during 1999. Two of these groups, the Animal Liberation
Front (ALF) and Earth Liberation Front (ELF), are classified as global terrorist groups by
this study because their motivation is global and their extensive use of the Internet gives
them a global capability (FBI, 1999:20).
Domestic terrorism is similar to traditional terrorism. Even though their areas of
operation and influence are limited, they benefit from contact or formal alliances with
other terrorist groups; therefore, these groups are not classified as traditional terrorists.
Examples of domestic terrorist organizations that benefit from contact with other
terrorists groups are Abu Sayyaf, who has been linked with the global terrorist group Al
Qaeda (Gunaratana, 2002:66; Chalk, 2001:251), and various Columbian terrorists groups,
who may have benefited from explosives training from the Irish Republican Army
(Department of State, 2002:63-64).
2.1.2 International Regional Terrorism. For the purpose of this research,
international regional terrorism is defined as terrorist groups who have organizational
goals and/or objectives that are limited to a national or regional level and have a primary
geographical area of operations that is either regional or global. A regional geographical
area refers to an area larger than a single nation, such as the Middle East, but smaller than
a continent. Of the 35 FTOs on the State Department’s list, 21 can be classified as
international regional terrorists. Of these 21 groups, 12 have primary ties to the Middle
East, 6 to Asia, 2 to Europe, and 1 to Africa. However, most of these groups operate in
more than one region, and several conduct operations within the U.S. and Europe. A few
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examples of international regional terrorists groups include the Real Irish Republican
Army (Real IRA) operating in Europe and the Islamic Resistance Movement (also known
as HAMAS) and Hezballah groups operating in the Middle East (FBI, 2002:1-3).
According to the State Department’s FTO list, regional terrorists dominate
today’s worldwide terrorist threat; besides being the largest category in numbers, regional
terrorists groups are also some of the oldest groups in the world (FBI, 2002:1-3). The
average life of a terrorist organization is 13-14 years (Gunaratna, 2002:13). However,
some of the oldest terrorist groups today are regional ethno-nationalist/separatist groups
(e.g., the Provisional IRA, the Al-Fatah, the PLO, and the Basque group Euskadi ta
Askatasuna) who have all been active for at least 30 years (Hoffman, 1998:170-171).
In addition to being older and more established, many regional terrorist
organizations have a very homogeneous membership. In fact, they are often identified as
religious terrorists because of their homogeneity rather than as secular terrorists based on
their motivations. Key examples are the PLO and the IRA; both groups are fighting for
redefinition of the current political boundaries for their region. However, they have a
strong religious component because their membership is entirely Islamic or Catholic,
respectively (Hoffman, 1998:87).
As stated earlier, the Palestinians are credited for initiating the trend of
publicizing regional terrorism on a global level. However, the Palestinian’s goals are still
regional, i.e., the reestablishment of the Palestine state and the defeat of Israel. A major
reason that regional dissidents choose terrorism as their primary method of operation is
that globally publicized regional terrorism often produces faster results than diplomatic
methods as illustrated below (Hoffman, 1998:68).
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As Zehdi Labib Terzi, the PLO’s [Palestinian Liberation Organization]
chief observer at the United Nations, reflected in a 1976 interview, ‘The
first several hijackings aroused the consciousness of the world and
awakened the media and world opinion much more – and more effectively
– than 20 years of pleading at the United Nations.’
The Palestinian attacks during the 1972 Munich Olympics reinforced this point as
millions watched the event unfold on television. In fact, a major lesson of this event was
that a failed terrorist operation can still be considered a huge success if there is enough
major media coverage of the event. “In terms of the publicity and exposure accorded to
the Palestinian cause, Munich was an unequivocal success – a point conceded by even the
most senior PLO officials” (Hoffman, 1998:73).
2.1.3 International Global Terrorism. For the purpose of this research,
international global terrorism is defined as terrorist groups who have organizational goals
and/or objectives that are regional or global in nature and have a primary geographical
area of operations that is multi-regional or global. Of the 35 FTOs listed by the State
Department, only the Al Qaeda group is classified as a global terrorist organization. Two
of America’s environmentally focused terrorist groups, ALF and ELF, fit this definition;
however, these organizations do not routinely kill people to get their terrorist message
across to the desired audience.
On the other hand, bin Laden and Al Qaeda have quite possibly taken the next
step in the evolution of modern terrorism--the globalization of terrorism (Gunaratna,
2002:11). Al Qaeda was created by Abdullah Azzam and Osama bin Laden towards the
end of the Afghan war with the Soviet Union. Abdullah Azzam is credited for
conceptualizing Al Qaeda in 1987 not only as a way to create an Army to defend Islam
but also as a way to capitalize on the capabilities and manpower of the Afghan mujahdin
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forces that had been assembled to expel the Soviets from Afghanistan (Gunaratna,
2002:3-4, 21-22). With their charter from Azzam to protect Islam, Al Qaeda supports
Islamic forces around the world with funding, training, and other support (Gunaratna,
2002:31, 71-72).
There are three major organizational factors that set Al Qaeda apart from other
terrorists groups: their inherited infrastructure and training, their international and
multinational membership, and their global business-like structure. Because of their
connection to the Afghan mujahdin, Al Qaeda obtained much of its Pakistani and Afghan
infrastructure from the supporters of the mujahdin, which had included the U.S. and the
Saudi Royal Family. Similarly, much of their training methods were adopted from the
U.S. and other western countries. For example, the 7,000-page Encyclopedia of Afghan
Jihad, a primary Al Qaeda training document, was taken from U.S. and British military
manuals (Gunaratna, 2002: 55, 71-72).
Similarly, Al Qaeda’s membership has no regional boundaries, unlike the
majority of regional terrorist groups. This was originally a result of the Afghan war with
the Soviets in which Osama bin Laden led the multinational mujahdin forces. The
multinational nature of their membership has continued primarily because Al Qaeda
recruits the best and most devout individuals from other terrorist groups. An additional
benefit of this practice is that it also provides Al Qaeda a deep supply of veteran recruits.
Al Qaeda maintains an elite reputation within the Islamic terrorist community; therefore,
many terrorists consider it a great honor to be invited to officially join Al Qaeda’s
membership. This recruiting process makes it very difficult for countries to infiltrate
spies into the Al Qaeda organization (Gunaratna, 2002:3 and 8).
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Al Qaeda, under bin Laden’s leadership, has created a global terrorist network
that supports Islamic extremists across the globe (Europe, Asia, Africa, the South Pacific,
etc.) and actively operates terrorist cells in Europe and North America (Gunaratna,
2002:55). Much of bin Laden’s leadership is based on his education in business, which
has led to the common comparison of Al Qaeda to a multinational corporation and to bin
Laden being dubbed the “CEO of Terrorism” (Gunaratna, 2002:68-69; Hoffman,
2002:306-307). This can be seen in the organizational structure of Al Qaeda shown in
Figure 2. At the top of the organization, bin Laden serves as the company president. The
major divisions of the company consist of operations (military committee), finance
(Finance and Business), public affairs (media and publicity), and religious guidance
(Fatwa and Islamic study). Like any modern corporation, bin Laden has developed a
global network as a significant part of the Al Qaeda structure. This global network
consists of terrorist cells worldwide and strategic alliances with many domestic and
regional Islamic terrorist organizations, thereby giving these organizations a global
capability while increasing the domestic and regional capabilities of Al Qaeda
(Gunaratna, 2002:8,45 and 57). This has made Al Qaeda the premier terrorist
organization of the 21st century (Hoffman, 2002:307).
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Figure 2. Al Qaeda’s Organizational Structure

On February 23, 1998, Osama bin Laden declared war on the United States when
he decreed that it is the holy duty of every Muslim to kill Americans and allies of
Americans (Gunaratna, 2002:45). The stated objective of this war was to drive U.S.
troops out of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Gunaratna, 2002:7). Al Qaeda has
subsequently conducted terrorist attacks against U.S. targets on land with the 1998 U.S.
Embassy bombings in Africa, at sea with the 2000 U.S.S. Cole bombing in the Indian
Ocean, and from the air with the September 11th suicide attacks in the U.S. (Gunaratna,
2002:7). Through these attacks, Al Qaeda demonstrated their ability to plan, coordinate,
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and execute multiple attacks almost simultaneously and over large distances with mass
causalities (Hoffman, 2002:306).

2.2 Modern Terrorist Threat
Some terrorist groups, such as the IRA, openly take credit for their attacks
(Hoffman, 2001:417). Other groups, most notably Al Qaeda, go out of their way to hide
their terrorist activities from their target nations (Gunaratna, 2002:3). Some groups, such
as the ALF and ELF, do not actively seek to kill people; instead, they focus on sabotaging
infrastructure (Howard and Sawyer, 2002:264-269). Other terrorist groups are engaged
in a “Holy War” to kill as many of the enemy as possible and actively seeking weapons
of mass destruction to accomplish their goals; the most prominent of these groups are Al
Qaeda and Aum Shinrikyo (Gunaratna, 2002:48-49; Howard and Sawyer, 2002:215;
Hoffman, 1998:121-127). To better understand the modern threat a terrorist group poses,
it is important to examine some key characteristics of terrorism: support, motivation, and
weaponry.
2.2.1 Support. One of the most important characteristics of a terrorist group is its
support base. While the type and source of support provided to a terrorist organization
has a significant effect on the group’s capabilities, it also limits a terrorist organization by
the level of violence that is acceptable to its supporters (Hoffman, 1998:94,168,189).
The more direct the support, the greater the chances are that the target government or the
international community may hold the supporters directly liable for the actions of the
terrorist group. Examples of this include the bombing of Pam Am Flight 103 over
Lockerbie, Scotland, and the 1986 bombing of a disco bar in West Berlin. These terrorist
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acts were attributed to Libya because of its direct support for terrorists in the late 1980s
(Department of State, 2002:67). However, the most significant example of this has to be
the American military retaliation for the September 11th attacks. The Afghan Taliban
government’s failure to turn over key Al Qaeda members resulted in a devastating war
with the U.S. that eventually led to the collapse of their government (Gunaratna, 2002:5152; Department of State, 2002:10).
2.2.1.1 Types of Support. Regardless of the person(s), organization, or
government providing the support to a terrorist organization, there are many different
types of support. For the purpose of this research, five types of support have been
identified: Moral, Logistical, Financial, Training, and Safe Haven. The motives and
capabilities of the supporters often determine the level of support provided, as seen
below.
2.2.1.1.1 Moral Support. The most basic and traditional type of indirect
support that can be provided to a terrorist group is moral support. When individuals,
private organizations, and/or governments publicly identify with the goals and objectives
of the terrorist group, they are providing moral support. Depending on one’s perspective,
moral support may appear highly illogical at times. A prime example is Osama bin
Laden. Despite the horrific nature of the September 11th attacks, bin Laden’s public and
moral support in many Islamic countries remained very high. Some of his supporters
even speculated that the Israelis or the U.S. orchestrated the attacks to involve the U.S. in
the fight against Islam and to frame bin Laden. In some cases, the support for Osama bin
Laden has increased as he is seen as a hero standing up to the onslaught of the U.S.
government (Gunaratna, 2002:52-53).
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Moral support can be an important factor in the success or failure of a terrorist
organization. Utilizing post-war sympathy because of the Holocaust, Jewish terrorists
were able to gain U.S. and international support, which eventually led to the restoration
of their ancestral homeland. The IRA has benefited from similar support from the Irish
American community in the U.S. to raise financial and logistical support for their cause
in Northern Ireland (Hoffman, 1998:54; Dingley, 2001:461). However, moral support
often limits the actions of the terrorist group, since any acts that violate an acceptable
level of public morality can damage or remove the support being provided to the terrorist
group. An example of this is the Real IRA bombing in Omagh, Northern Ireland. The
Real IRA, who opposes the Northern Ireland Peace Process, set up a bombing to support
their cause and claim to be the “Real IRA” as opposed to the Provisional IRA to which
they use to belong. The Provisional IRA’s tactics included calling government
authorities to warn of any planned bombings and allow for the evacuation of innocent
civilians. During one of its bombing acts, the Real IRA’s phone call mistakenly moved
innocent civilians closer to the bomb and resulted in 29 people being killed and over 200
being injured. The resulting public backlash strengthened the Provisional IRA, cost the
Real IRA some of its support, allowed the government to pass tougher antiterrorism laws,
and forced the Real IRA to limit its activity until the “dust has settled” (Dingley,
2001:451, 460-463).
2.2.1.1.2 Logistical Support. A common method of providing direct
support to terrorist groups is through logistical support. While logistical support is most
commonly linked to state-sponsored terrorism; it can also be provided by individuals,
private organizations, and other terrorist groups. Regardless of the source, logistical
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support can drastically improve a terrorist organization’s capabilities through higher
quality weapons, communications equipment, intelligence data, etc. Additionally, state
sponsorship gives terrorists access to diplomatic transportation and facilities with which
personnel and assets can be moved in a much more secure manner (Hoffman, 1998:186187).
Iran, Syria, and Libya have traditionally provided logistical support to terrorists in
the Middle East (Department of State, 2002:64-68; Hoffman, 1998:185-196). In fact,
Iran is considered one of the largest arms suppliers to Middle Eastern terrorist groups.
Western intelligence sources estimated that Iran sent three Boeing 747 aircraft per month
to Syria in 1996 with weapons to support Middle East terrorists (Hoffman, 1998:193) In
2001, the Israeli forces captured a ship delivering over 50 tons of weapons to Middle East
terrorist groups, with the majority of the weapons coming from Iran (Department of
State, 2002:65).
If an organization is financially independent, it can acquire its own logistical
support. For example, Al Qaeda purchased an airplane and routinely leases private
aircraft to move equipment, including U.S. Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, and personnel
from Pakistan to Sudan (Gunaratna, 2002:37). Al Qaeda also uses private planes to
transport top-of-the-line military hardware bought in the U.S. and Europe to their
operating and training locations in the Middle East. This military hardware included,
among other things, 25 fifty caliber sniper rifles with 1-mile accuracy and night vision
equipment, both of which were identical or near identical to that used by the U.S. military
(Bergen, 2001:431; Gunaratna, 2002:37).
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2.2.1.1.3 Financial Support. As with any organization, money is required
for day-to-day operations and financial support can be either overtly or covertly provided
to terrorists. For instance, many wealthy Middle Eastern businessmen covertly support
terrorist groups through the use of several Middle Eastern businesses and banks to
disguise the transactions (Gunaratna, 2002:62). Other supporters, such as many state
sponsors, openly give money to terrorist organizations out of support or for services
rendered (Department of State, 2002:65; Wallace, 2003:2).
However, financial support does not have to be in hard currency; a prime example
is African “conflict diamonds” which can be sold for cash (Department of State, 2002:6).
Many terrorist organizations have even started to seek out alternative funding sources so
they are less dependent on external supporters. This has resulted in two new sources of
support: criminal activity and organizational self-sustainment. Both of these sources will
be covered in greater detail later in the next section.
Regardless of its form, financial support can be used by terrorists to purchase
necessary equipment and sustain the organization’s members. As identified earlier, Al
Qaeda used their financial resources to buy and lease aircraft to gain a greater level of
operational security and to buy weapons and other operational equipment (Bergen,
2001:431; Gunaratna, 2002:37). Al Qaeda also provided their members with a monthly
stipend; some members even received employment with legitimate Al Qaeda business
interests. Al Qaeda also provides basic medical support for members and their families
(Gunaratna, 2002:33).
2.2.1.1.4 Training Support. Many terrorist groups have access to training
and training materials from other terrorist groups. For example, Al Qaeda provides
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training and training material on an ideological and recruiting basis (Gunaratna, 2002:31)
and has published a 7000-page training manual called the Encyclopedia of the Afghan
Jihad (Gunaratna, 2002:70). Other terrorist groups, such as the PLO, operate training
camps and offer training to other terrorist groups as a source of income (Hoffman,
1998:84). In addition to this quid pro quo relationship, state sponsorship of a terrorist
group often includes elite military training (Hoffman 1998:187). Iran, Iraq, Syria, Sudan,
Libya, Afghanistan, and Cuba either currently provide or have provided training, training
materials, or training bases to several terrorist groups (Department of State, 2002:63-68;
Gunaratna, 2002: 30, 58-60; Hoffman, 1998:186-187). Afghanistan was a unique case
since it was Al Qaeda that was supporting the government with funding and training in
return for safe haven for Al Qaeda’s bases and personnel (Gunaratna, 2002:58-60, and
62).
2.2.1.1.5 Safe Haven. Safe haven, which normally includes an agreement
of nonextradition to hostile countries, is when a country allows terrorists to live and/or
operate openly and freely in their country. Safe havens allow terrorist organizations to
openly operate training and support facilities as well as engage in legitimate business
activities to generate funding. Iran, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Libya, Afghanistan, and Cuba
have all provided some type of safe haven for terrorist groups (Department of State,
2002:63-68; Gunaratna, 2002:30, 58-60; Hoffman, 1998:186-187). Even Lebanon, who
is not the listed by the State Department as a state sponsor of terrorism, allows anti-Israeli
terrorist groups to operate openly in their country because they do not consider them to
be terrorists (Department of State, 2002:57). The Afghan Taliban government openly
provided a base of operations for Al Qaeda and ended up going to war with the U.S.
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(Gunaratna, 2002:51-52; Department of State, 2002:10). While enjoying safe haven in
Sudan, Al Qaeda started legitimate businesses, conducted training operations, and even
researched chemical, biological, radioactive, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons (Gunaratna,
2002:30-37).
2.2.1.2 Sources of Support. The types of support identified above may be
provided by a number of different sources. For the purpose of this research, five sources
of support have been identified: Public, State, Criminal, Private and Self-sustaining.
2.2.1.2.1 Public Support. Public support, tied very closely to moral
support, often provides the foundation for terrorist groups to exist. As previously
mentioned, Al Qaeda is a prime example of this. Even after the atrocities of September
11th, bin Laden still has excellent public support throughout the Middle East (Gunaratna,
2002:52-53). Iraq is another example; they have openly supported terrorist groups and
have been standing up to the U.S. and the international community for years. On 17
January 2003, thousands of Palestinians protested in the streets of Gaza City in support of
Saddam’s resistance to the U.S. Some even condemned PLO chairman Yasser Arafat for
selling out the Palestinian cause to the U.S. (Wallace, 2003:1).
2.2.1.2.2 State Support. Of all sources of support, state sponsorship of
terrorism continues to have the largest impact on the effectiveness of terrorist groups
(Hoffman, 1998:186). State sponsorship of terrorism is not new as it has been observed
throughout history. The Serbians were implicated in the terrorist assassination of the
Habsburg Archduke Ferdinand that started the chain of events resulting in World War I
(Hoffman, 1998:21-23). During the Cold War, the Soviets were often suspected of
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sponsoring terrorism, with the most credible accusation being the 1981 attempted
assassination of Pope John Paul II in Rome (Hoffman, 1998:21-23,27, and 191).
The critical turning point in open state sponsorship of terrorism came in 1979
with the Iran hostage scandal; for the first time, a weaker nation showed that it could
keep a “Superpower” at bay using terrorism (Hoffman, 1998:186). Following the lead of
Iran, several nations started to utilize terrorist groups as tool of foreign policy (Hoffman
1998:186; Medd and Goldstien, 1997:284). This led to terrorism being considered an
alternative option to war, especially in the Middle East against Israel and the U.S.
(Hoffman 1998:27,186). The U.S. State Department keeps a list of countries considered
by the U.S. to be state sponsors of terrorism. The list currently includes seven countries:
Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria, and Sudan (Department of State, 2002:63).
Prior to the events of 2001, these states have provided varying degrees of support to
terrorists around the world, with Iran being considered the most active in its support.
After the September 11th attacks against the U.S.; Iran, Libya, Sudan, and Syria openly
condemned the terrorist attacks (Department of State, 2002:64). North Korea issued a
statement that it opposed terrorism and those who support it. Cuba spoke out against the
U.S. “war on terrorism” but eventually signed all 12 of the counterterrorism conventions
passed by the United Nations (U.N.). Iraq was the only country on the list to openly
support the terrorist attacks by indicating that the U.S. was “… reaping the fruits of [its]
crimes against humanity” (Department of State, 2002:63-68).
In the past, the U.S. launched military actions against countries sponsoring
terrorism, Libya in the 1980s and Afghanistan in the 1990s, with limited results
(Hoffman, 1998:192-193; Gunaratna, 2002:47). However, in response to the September
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11th attacks, President George W. Bush left no room for interpretation on the U.S.
position towards state-sponsored terrorism when he said, “Every nation, in every region,
now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists”
(Department of State, 2002:63). It is also fair to assume that the 2001-2002 U.S. invasion
of Afghanistan and the toppling of the Afghan Taliban government sent a strong message
to the sponsors of terrorism. It is thought that not even bin Laden fully understood the
wrath that would befall him and his supporters, not only from the U.S. but from the
international community (Gunaratna, 2002:51).
Another turning point in state-sponsored terrorism was the end of the Cold War.
With the fall of the Soviet Union, states sponsoring terrorism began to shift from
communist nations to primarily Middle Eastern countries (Laqueur, 1996: 26; Medd and
Goldstein, 1997: 284). While it has not been clearly proven how much support the Soviet
Union directly provided to terrorists, it is clear that the Soviets were key supporters of the
majority of nations supporting terrorism. The reduction of Soviet support to these nations
resulted in reduced funding levels for terrorist organizations. This caused some terrorist
groups to search for new funding sources, especially those in the Middle East where there
was still strong government support against the hated Israelis. Others developed
partnerships with organized crime syndicates, such as narcoterrorism (Medd and
Goldstein, 1997:284-285), or developed their own ways to either legally or illegally
generate operating funds (Gunaratna, 2002: 61-65).
2.2.1.2.3 Criminal Support. With this shift in state-sponsored terrorism,
terrorist groups being sponsored in other regions of the world were forced to find new
funding sources (Medd and Goldstein, 1997:284). Some of these groups either formed
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partnerships with organized crime groups or turned to committing their own crimes to
raise funds (Medd and Goldstein, 1997:284-285). For example, it is estimated
Colombian terrorists collected $400 million in ransom payments from 1993 to 1996
(Medd and Goldstein, 1997:284-285). During the 1990s, the Central Intelligence Agency
estimates that 50 Islamic charities had some kind of ties to terrorist organizations; in
many cases, terrorists were diverting funds from legitimate charities to fund their
activities (Gunaratna, 2002:62). For example, Al Qaeda trains specific support cells to
run credit card fraud schemes and other scams as fundraising operations (Gunaratna,
2002:62-63). Some terrorist organizations abandoned their ideological roots and strictly
became a “gun for hire” outfit (Hoffman, 1998:187).
2.2.1.2.4 Private and Self-sustaining. Many terrorist organizations,
especially in the Middle East, generate funds through private donations and selfsustaining businesses and investments; once again, Al Qaeda has perfected this method of
fundraising more than any other terrorist group (Gunaratna, 2002:60-66). However, the
PLO was one of the first terrorist groups to open training camps and charge other terrorist
groups. They were also one of the first to begin accumulating wealth through
investments. In the 1980s, it was estimated that the PLO’s annual income was $600
million, with approximately $500 million of that coming from investments (Hoffman,
1998:84). The Abu Nidal organization, another Palestinian group, is estimated to be
worth over $400 million, which was acquired through “gun for hire” operations and
financial investments (Hoffman, 2002:187).
Al Qaeda has been the most successful terrorist organization in obtaining private
funding and becoming a self-sustaining organization, primarily because bin Laden turned
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Al Qaeda into a global business (Hoffman, 2002:307; Gunaratna, 2002:68-69). He used
his business degree to establish several legitimate business and non-governmental groups
to generate and launder money (Chalk, 2002:251; Gunaratna, 2002:61-69). He also
established “The World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders” to form
a global network for the organization. Within this organization, there was strict
compartmentalization of subordinate groups and an emphasis on strict monetary controls
(Gunaratna, 2002: 65). Because bin Laden was so successful in creating a global terrorist
organization, Al Qaeda serves as a private sponsor for other terrorist groups joining their
coalition against Israel and the U.S. The most telling key of Al Qaeda’s success was that
they were the first terrorist organization to provide financial and military support to their
host government (Gunaratna, 2002:62). Al Qaeda’s support for other terrorist
organizations, even governments, who share common motivations, could represent the
next evolution in the sponsorship of terrorism.
2.2.2 Motivation. Changes in the sponsorship of terrorism have also resulted in
changing motivations. During the 1970s, terrorists were motivated primarily by political
ideologies and were often referred to as freedom fighters. In the 1980s, these political
motivations were reinforced by the Islamic anti-West movement sponsored by Iran; the
1980s also saw an increase in economic motivations. In the 1990s, economic reasons
moved to the forefront of terrorists’ motivations (Medd and Goldstein, 1997:283-285).
Today, there are three primary types of motivation for modern terrorists:
Secular/Political, Religious, and Special Interest.
2.2.2.1 Secular/Political. Historically, the motivation of terrorists has waivered
between secular/political and religious; however, secular/political motivations were the
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dominant force until the 1980s (Hoffman, 1998:90). Although many secular terrorist
groups, such as the PLO and the IRA, have distinct religious affiliations, their
overarching goals are politically motivated; these terrorist groups choose terrorism as a
methodology because it is perceived to be more effective in achieving the desired
political and/or cultural changes (Hoffman, 1998:168). This is clearly demonstrated in
the earlier quote from Zehdi Labib Terzi that “The first several hijackings aroused the
consciousness of the world and awakened the media and world opinion much more – and
more effectively – than 20 years of pleading at the United Nations” (Hoffman, 1998:68).
Even though both the PLO and the IRA have strong religious ties, both groups desire
political independence from their current ruling governments, thereby making them
secular organizations (Hoffman, 1998:87). It is critical for secular organizations to
maintain an environment of public support within the regional or international
community. This constrains their methodology; the indiscriminate use of violence and
the resulting injuries and deaths of innocent civilians would damage their public support
(Hoffman, 1998:87 and 168).
2.2.2.2 Religious. In a study of mass causality bombings (25 fatalities or more) for
the last half of the 20th century, 47 of 76 were religious in nature and accounted for 3,952
of 5,690 fatalities; however, the same study noted that, “Although it is true that
‘religious’ terrorists are indeed much more willing to kill in large numbers, it is far from
clear how one can differentiate the religious from the other terrorists” (Quillen, 2002a:
287-288). The key difference between a secular and religious terrorist organization is
how they justify their terrorist activities; religious terrorists believe that the use of
extremely violent terrorism is ordained by God (Hoffman, 1998:89-90). Religious
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terrorists believe that God’s opinion is the only one that matters; therefore, they have
little concern for what any outside individual or group may think about their attacks
(Hoffman, 1998: 94). Religious terrorists feel it is their religious duty to eliminate an
entire group of people.
In Islamic terrorism, the Fatawa is a religious edict issued by an Islamic holy man
proclaiming that God has sanctioned the terrorist attack; thus, the Fatawa is considered
the most important motivation for Islamic terrorists (Gunaratna, 2002:7 and 84; Hoffman,
1998:97 and 191). Currently, the threat of Al Qaeda and its brand of Islamic terrorism
are of particular interest to the U.S. From its inception, Al Qaeda has considered itself to
be the vanguard of warriors defending the Islamic faith. When the U.S. and coalition
forces were asked to drive Iraqi forces from Kuwait, Al Qaeda was outraged that their allMuslim army was not used. Al Qaeda’s rage continued to build when U.S. forces,
referred to as infidels by the terrorists, did not leave their “Holy Land” in Saudi Arabia
(Gunaratna, 2002:27-29)
A close kin to religious terrorists are religious cults and hate groups. These
organizations often exhibit the same extreme religious zealot qualities. One of the most
dangerous terrorist organizations in the world, the Japanese religious cult Aum Shinirkyo,
has consistently tried to use weapons of mass destruction to fulfill their religious
motivations (Hoffman, 1998:126-127). Within the U.S., some white supremacists and
anti-government groups have been linked with terrorist attacks. The most infamous of
these domestic terrorist attacks was the Oklahoma City bombing (Hoffman, 1998:87 and
168).
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2.2.2.3 Special Interest. Special interest terrorism is a category used by the FBI to
refer to types of terrorism that are based on environmental and economic reasons and not
the traditional motivations. There have been a few terrorist events related to economics
and the World Trade Organization; however, the majority of events related to special
interest terrorism have been linked to environmental extremists such as the ALF and
ELF. Although environmental terrorism is extremely active, especially in North
America, the relatively low level of violence associated with it does not constitute as
much of a threat as that posed by international regional and global terrorism (FBI,
1999:32-33).
2.2.3 Weaponry. Combined with these troubling developments in sponsorship
and motivation, there has been a rising trend of “superterrorism,” which is defined as the
significant increase in the number of fatalities and injuries per terrorist attack. The era of
superterrorism began with the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center (Medd and
Goldstein, 1997:286). Since then, incidents include the 1995 nerve gas attack in a Tokyo
subway, the 1995 bombing of a federal building in Oklahoma City (classified as domestic
terrorism), and the September 11th suicide attacks using commercial airliners. This
movement towards mass casualties has resulted in an escalation in the use of more
advanced weapons by terrorists. This study will focus on three types of terrorist
weapons: traditional guns and bombs, conventional mass casualty weapons, and Weapons
of Mass Destruction (WMD)/Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN).
2.2.3.1 Guns and Bombs. Terrorists have traditionally used guns and bombs to
achieve their goals. Over the years, these weapons provided terrorists with sufficient
flexibility to control the level of violence being used (Hoffman, 2001:417). Guns and
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bombs remain the weapons of choice for terrorist organizations that must show discretion
in their attacks to maintain their support structures (e.g., Real IRA, 17 November, and
Basque Fatherland and Liberty, a.k.a., ETA). The only advancement in the use of these
weapons has been the availability of more sophisticated explosives (Medd and Goldstein,
1997; 283).
2.2.3.2 Conventional Mass Casualty Weapons. Since the birth of modern
terrorism in 1968, there is historical evidence that terrorist actions have become
increasingly violent. Religious terrorism is believed to be a significant factor in this rise
in mass casualty terrorism, which is defined as any terrorist event causing 25 or more
deaths (Quillen, 2002a:280). Under this definition, terrorist events that cause massive
injuries, such as the 1995 Tokyo sarin gas attack, are not considered mass casualty
terrorism (Quillen, 2002a:280). Including the September 11th attacks, which used
unconventional means with conventional weapons, terrorists have been successful using
conventional bombs to produce mass casualty results. This is attributed to two factors:
the established knowledge of terrorists in the use of conventional explosives and their
recognition of the complexity involved in the use of CBRN weapons on a mass scale.
However, this has not stopped terrorists from trying to procure and develop the use of
CBRN weapons.
2.2.3.3 WMD/CBRN. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are chemical,
biological, or nuclear (CBN) weapons originally design by nations to generate large
casualties against enemies during times of war. More recently, the terminology has been
changed to CBRN to denote the use of nuclear technology to produce radiological
dispersion weapons, which are less damaging than a full-scale nuclear device but easier
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to produce and still psychologically effective. After all, terrorism is a psychological form
of social conflict and no weapons have instilled more psychological fear in humanity than
WMD/CBRN. Although there is no knowledge of a terrorist organization fielding a fully
capable nuclear weapon, terrorists have planned and/or attempted to use radiological,
chemical, and biological weapons. Therefore, the primary concern is to ensure that the
few nations who have military grade WMD/CBRN technology maintain strict controls to
prevent it from falling into the hands of terrorist organizations.
The means required to produce WMD/CBRN weapons is very scientifically
involved and the only group to have any success is Aum Shinirkyo, a Japanese religious
cult with an unusually high cadre of professional scientists. Although they are the only
terrorist group to repeatedly attempt to use CBRN technology, they have had the most
success with chemical weapons. The two most notable examples are the 1994 nerve gas
attack in Tokyo that killed 7 and hospitalized 250 and the 1995 sarin gas attack of a
Tokyo subway in which 12 were killed and 5000 were injured (Hoffman, 1998:126;
Medd and Goldstein, 1997; 285). This group has also tried to use biological weapons,
botulinus and anthrax, on several occasions but with no real success. There is a strong
concern that the Aum Shinirkyo terrorist group has an interest in using nuclear WMD
since they are known to have purchased a farm in Australia for the purpose of mining
uranium (Hoffman, 1998:125).

2.3 Modern Government Responses to Terrorism
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The ever increasing flexibility and capability of terrorist organizations cause
problems for the U.S. and other nations who are the targets of terrorism and are trying to
defend themselves. These factors make defending a “free” nation extremely difficult due
to the near infinite number of targets that are available to terrorists (Office of Homeland
Security, 2002:vii). Additionally, governments are usually in the position of planning
and reacting to the last big attack; therefore, their actions lag those of the terrorist. This
was evident in the birth of modern counterterrorism. Recall that the start of modern
international terrorism is usually attributed to the 1968 hijacking of an El Al commercial
flight from Rome to Tel Aviv. However, most countries, especially European countries,
did not start to organize specialized police and military units to deal specifically with the
threat of terrorism until after the Palestinian attack on Israeli athletes at the 1972
Olympics (Hoffman, 1998:72-73). To develop a better understanding of the interactions
between terrorist organizations and governments, this section of the literature review
explored three areas: stages of modern counterterrorism, national and international
cooperation in counterterrorism, and the long-term solution to terrorism.
2.3.1 Stages of Modern Counterterrorism. The countries with the most
successful counterterrorism operations have been those that relied on a long-term strategy
of prevention, proactive operations, and post-event investigation (Veness, 2001:414).
The U.S. Office of Homeland Security (OHS) identified six critical mission areas for
U.S. counterterrorism operations: intelligence and warning, border and transportation
security, domestic counterterrorism, protecting critical infrastructure, defending against
catastrophic terrorism, and emergency preparedness. It also stated, “The first three
mission areas focus primarily on preventing terrorist attacks; the next two on reducing

39

our Nation’s vulnerabilities; and the final one on minimizing the damage and recovering
from attacks that do occur” (Office of Homeland Security, 2002:viii). These mission
areas can be aligned with the three areas of counterterrorism identified by Veness (2001).
2.3.1.1 Prevention. Prevention is intended to passively interdict terrorist activity
during the reconnaissance, preparation, attack, and escape phases through an overt
government presence, especially local law enforcement personnel and defensive actions
to protect critical assets (Veness, 2001:414). In essence, prevention involves taking
defensive steps against a suspected threat with the goal of preventing damage to the
suspected target. This can be better understood by reviewing the critical mission areas
emphasizing prevention: border and transportation security, protecting critical
infrastructure, and defending against catastrophic terrorism (Office of Homeland
Security, 2002:viii-x). Although domestic counterterrorism could be classified as
prevention, it will be discussed as a proactive operation.
Border and transportation security attempts to prevent terrorists from using the
domestic and global transportation system to conduct their terrorist operations within the
U.S. without significantly hampering the legitimate free flow of people and commerce
comprising the heart of American society (Office of Homeland Security, 2002:21-22).
An example of this type of preventive action would be the 14 December 1999
apprehension of a terrorist transporting bomb-making material across the U.S.-Canadian
border (FBI, 1999:9). Border guards discovered the terrorist during the normal execution
of their duties. The guards became suspicious of the individual and acted in an
appropriate manner to investigate their suspicions; thus, the daily execution of their jobs
resulted in the passive prevention of a terrorist attack.

40

“America’s critical infrastructure encompasses a large number of sectors[:]”
agriculture, food, water, public health, emergency services, government, defense
industrial base, information and telecommunications, energy, transportation, banking and
finance, chemical industry, and postal and shipping (Office of Homeland Security,
2002:30). The non-interrupted functioning of this infrastructure is considered critical to
the defense, economy, and public health and safety of America. Prevention measures
typically taken to protect the critical infrastructure include actions to deter, deflect, and/or
mitigate the effects of a terrorist attack (Office of Homeland Security, 2002:29-30). “For
example, the Department of Defense has flown more than 22,000 combat air patrol
missions within the United States since September 11 to protect our critical infrastructure
from air attacks” (Office of Homeland Security, 2002:A-2).
Finally, the need to defend against catastrophic terrorism was clearly
demonstrated by the events of September 11th; however, this critical area goes beyond the
threat of conventional mass casualty. The threat posed by terrorists potentially acquiring
and using CBRN technology dictates that the U.S. reconsider its approach to catastrophic
acts to ensure the safety of the American people (Office of Homeland Security, 2002:3738). The anthrax attacks on the U.S. eastern seaboard in late 2001 highlighted the need
for the U.S. to have an active anti-CBRN program. Recent actions by the U.S. in this
area include the acquisition of 200 million smallpox vaccines and expansion of the
National Pharmaceutical Stockpile (Office of Homeland Security, 2002:A-3).
Determining the effectiveness of preventive actions can be very difficult.
Therefore, detailed assessments of the terrorist threat and the nation’s vulnerabilities are
one of the best ways of ensuring that preventative actions have a chance of directing
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terrorist attacks away from an individual target: person(s), building, infrastructure, or
equipment (Office of Homeland Security, 2002:16-17). However, even when these
actions are successful, preventive (or defensive) actions are only effective as mitigating
factors over the short-term.
The struggle against terrorism, however, is never-ending. Terrorism has
existed for 2,000 years and owes its survival to an ability to adapt and
adjust to challenges and countermeasures and to continue to identify and
exploit its opponent’s vulnerability. (Hoffman, 2002:314)
The Irish Republican Army (IRA) is a classic example of this never-ending cycle; over
the last 20 years, they have perfected their bomb-making skill. Each time the United
Kingdom develops a technology to counter the IRA’s most recent bombing technologies;
the IRA develops a new bombing technology or technique (Hoffman, 1998:180-183).
2.3.1.2 Proactive Action. Proactive action is overt and covert intelligence-driven
actions designed to actively interdict known terrorist organizations and known terrorist
actions (Veness, 2001:414). Proactive actions deliberately act on specific knowledge in
order to intercept an attack, to reduce a terrorist’s offensive capability, and/or to
incapacitate a terrorist group. Of the six critical mission areas identified by the OHS,
intelligence and warning and domestic counterterrorism are considered to involve
proactive actions (Office of Homeland Security, 2002:viii-ix).
Intelligence and warning is the foundation of proactive counterterrorism
operations. The element of surprise is critical to the overall success of a terrorist attack,
as with any form of human conflict (Office of Homeland Security, 2002:15). This was
proven on September 11th when terrorists successfully commandeered multiple
commercial aircraft as part of a well-coordinated and simultaneous terrorist attack.
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Controlling the element of surprise was so important during the Cold War that the U.S.
spent billions of dollars in early warning systems to detect the launch of nuclear weapons
(Office of Homeland Security, 2002:15). However, the shadowy nature of terrorism
makes it far more difficult to detect future terrorist actions than the legitimate actions of
nation states (Office of Homeland Security, 2002:15).
The responsibility for domestic counterterrorism belongs to federal, state, and
local law enforcement agencies. The attacks on September 11th highlighted the need for
law enforcement agencies to place a higher priority on both passive and active
interdiction of terrorist activities. To improve the domestic counterterrorism capabilities
of U.S. law enforcement agencies, efforts are underway to significantly improve
communications between intelligence agencies and law enforcement agencies at all
levels: international, federal, state, and local (Office of Homeland Security, 2002:25-26).
The events of September 11th initiated the largest criminal investigation in U.S. history.
This investigation, conducted by U.S. law enforcement agencies with the cooperation of
the international community, resulted in the freezing of over $112 million in terrorist
assets and those who support terrorism and the arrest of over 3,000 suspected terrorists
(Bush, 2003:1; Office of Homeland Security, 2002:28 and A-1).
While domestic counterterrorism belongs primarily to the law enforcement
community, U.S. counterterrorism efforts outside the United States include various
options: U.S. or international military, international law enforcement community, or the
U.S. or international intelligence services (Department of State, 2002:vii-xiii). In fact,
one of the most significant impacts of September 11th has been the international coalition
against terrorism orchestrated by the Department of State. This coalition includes
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support from 160 nations that have joined the U.S. in identifying and stopping terrorists
(Office of Homeland Security, 2002:A-1). In order for proactive action to work, experts
on the subject agree on the importance of gathering good intelligence, especially good
human intelligence, on the activities and motivations of terrorists (Hoffman, 1998:211;
Office of Homeland Security, 2002:15-16; Veness, 2001:414-415). Once a nation knows
who the enemy is, recognizes the threat they pose, and understands how they make
decisions, it can take proactive steps to actively interdict the terrorist threat.
2.3.1.3 Post-Event Investigation. Post-event investigation includes the collection
of evidence to identify and convict those responsible for the terrorist action (Veness,
2001:414). Of the six critical mission areas identified by the OHS, domestic
counterterrorism and emergency preparedness are considered to involve post-event
investigative actions (Office of Homeland Security, 2002:viii-ix). Post-event
investigation, by definition, cannot stop the current terrorist attack at hand; however,
post-event investigation limits collateral damage from the attack by securing the scene of
the attack, identifying the terrorists responsible for the attack, providing evidence for the
criminal prosecution of those responsible, and/or preventing future attacks through
lessons learned.
U.S. law enforcement officials are part of a larger group of “first responders,”
which also includes fire and emergency services personnel, who respond to the scene of a
crime or disaster (Office of Homeland Security, 2002:A-2). “America’s first line of
defense in the aftermath of any terrorist attack is its first responder community” (Office
of Homeland Security, 2002:41). Emergency preparedness increases the quickness and
efficiency of first responders and other government follow-on emergency personnel,
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which can make a significant difference in mitigating the damage caused by terrorist
attacks (Office of Homeland Security, 2002:41). A prime example of this is the actions
of the New York City firefighters and policemen to evacuate the World Trade Center
prior to and during the collapse of towers one and two on September 11th, significantly
reducing the total number of fatalities from the attacks. Since September 11th, Congress
has appropriated $650 million to support state and local first responders for specialized
terrorism preparedness (Office of Homeland Security, 2002:A-2).
Besides identifying the parties responsible for an attack, post-event investigations
also help identify flaws in counterterrorism measures. This was observed at the start of
modern counterterrorism, the 1972 terrorist attack on the Munich Olympics, when
lessons learned from this event demonstrated the need for specialized counterterrorism
teams (Hoffman, 1998:72-73). It can also be seen in the earlier example of the evolution
of IRA bomb-making expertise in response to Britain’s improved counterterrorism efforts
(Hoffman, 1998:180-183).
During the discovery phase of post-event investigation, many future terrorist
attacks have been discovered and prevented by information that was uncovered during
the investigation. A key example of this, which sent shockwaves through the
counterterrorism community, was evidence acquired during the investigation of Aum
Shinrikyo after the 1995 sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway system. During raids on
Aum Shinrikyo facilities, authorities found enough sarin gas to kill an estimated 4.2
million people. In addition, it was discovered that Aum Shinrikyo had produced or had
plans to produce other chemical weapons (including mustard gas, sodium cyanide, VX,
tabun, and soman) as well as biological weapons (including anthrax, Q-fever, and Ebola)
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(Hoffman, 1998:125). All of these weapons are potentially very deadly WMD assets that
could cause significant harm and damage to a society. However, post-event
investigations for terrorist acts are routinely crossing the traditional lines of government
and require cooperation across all levels: local, state, federal, and international (Office of
Homeland Security, 2002:A-1).
2.3.2 National and International Cooperation on Counterterrorism. The
ability of modern terrorists to transit local, state/provincial, and national borders while
planning, training, staging, and executing their terrorist activities requires governments at
all levels to cooperate in order to stem the tide of terrorism (Office of Homeland Security,
2002:1-2,59). The development of national and international governmental cooperation
resulted from the evolution of terrorism and counterterrorism (Veness, 2001:412-413).
This study examines cooperation on two distinct levels: national and international.
2.3.2.1 National Level. The U.S., as with most developed nations, addresses acts
of domestic terrorism and international terrorist attacks within their own borders as
criminal activity (Veness, 2001:413). The national vision for law with respect to
Homeland Security is stated as, “We are a nation built on the rule of law, and we will
utilize our laws to win the war on terrorism while protecting our civil liberties” (Office of
Homeland Security, 2002:48). The treatment of terrorism as a crime creates some unique
challenges and significant benefits for governments, especially modern Western
democracies. The major challenges are maintaining political will, better understanding
the amorphous nature of terrorist organizations, and streamlining the government
bureaucracy. The major benefit is the erosion of terrorism support structures.
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2.3.2.1.1 Political Will. In any democratic society, political will is the
heart and soul of government. Prior to September 11th, the political will within the U.S.
government resisted establishing new laws that increased the government’s ability to
fight terrorism at the expense of individuals’ personal freedoms. As of 1999, there were
various Executive Orders, Presidential Decision Directives, and Congressional statutes
addressing the issue of terrorism; however, there was not a single federal law specifically
making terrorism a crime. Instead, the national political will wanted to address terrorism
within the existing U.S. legal framework (FBI, 1999:i). However, since the September
11th attacks in 2001, the U.S. government and its citizens have developed both a more
profound understanding of the threat posed by terrorism and a stronger political will
towards combating it. This has resulted in sweeping changes to the U.S. government and
how it approaches terrorism (Office of Homeland Security, 2002:1). The 2003 State of
the Union address by President Bush exemplifies this commitment to an extended
political will towards terrorism.
Our war against terror is a contest of will in which perseverance is power.
In the ruins of two towers, at the western wall of the Pentagon, on a field
in Pennsylvania, this nation made a pledge, and we renew that pledge
tonight: Whatever the duration of this struggle, and whatever the
difficulties, we will not permit the triumph of violence in the affairs of
men -- free people will set the course of history. (Bush, 2003:2)
The major question regarding political will is the appropriate balance between personal
freedoms and new laws to help U.S. counterterrorism operations (Office of Homeland
Security, 2002:48).
2.3.2.1.2 Amorphous Nature of Terrorism. The amorphous nature of
modern terrorist organizations challenges the U.S. because the evidentiary ties between
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the organization and its members are not clearly defined. This makes it more difficult for
the government to prosecute the organization for the actions of individual members.
Primarily, there are two types of amorphous terrorist groups: part-time terrorist groups
and full-time or regular terrorist organizations. Part-time terrorist groups are loose
organizations of like-minded individuals willing to utilize violence to change a perceived
problem with the current society; these groups are normally considered to be domestic
terrorists. The majority of U.S. domestic terrorism reported by the FBI in their annual
reports falls into this category. Hoffman (1998) cites the Oklahoma City bombing by
Timothy McVeigh as an example of this type of terrorism by highlighting the ties
between McVeigh and the Michigan Militia, which is classified as part of the larger
American Christian Patriot movement. However, only McVeigh and his partner were
tried and convicted for the Oklahoma City attack (Hoffman, 1998:105-107).
The second form of amorphous terrorist groups are traditional terrorist groups
who have realized that there is an inherent benefit to keeping a low profile. Al Qaeda’s
adoption of this policy has been cited as one reason for their success to date (Hoffman,
2002:306-307). Al Qaeda even established organizational rules to make it more difficult
for governments to legally prove their involvement in terrorist actions (Gunaratna,
2002:35).
2.3.2.1.3 Bureaucracy. Bureaucracy is a primary concern in the
effectiveness of any governmental organization, especially in a democracy, because it has
a tendency to hinder interagency cooperation. Although the threat of terrorism is not
likely to change the actual process of government established by the Constitution, the
effects of multiple actors inside and outside the government will continue to make public
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policy on terrorism a compromise between opposing positions and opposing agendas
(Crenshaw, 2001:335). Therefore, to maximize the U.S. government’s organizational
efficiency in the fight against terrorism, the White House developed the National Strategy
for Homeland Security and established the Department of Homeland Security (Office of
Homeland Security, 2002:vii-xiii).
2.3.2.1.4 Erosion of Terrorist Support. The major benefit of criminalizing
terrorism comes from the fact that “terrorism is fundamentally a form of psychological
warfare” (Hoffman, 2002:313). If the government effectively produces an environment
in which terrorism is socially unacceptable, the government can establish a media
campaign that minimizes the attention, sympathy, and moral support that many terrorist
organizations seek in order to maintain their support structures (Veness, 2001:413).
Since the cardinal rule of conflict is to “know your enemy” (Hoffman, 2002:306), it is
important to consider what the targeted terrorist group is trying to accomplish and
understand their underlying motivation.
All terrorists, however, have one trait in common: they live in the future,
live for the distant – yet imperceptibly close – point in time when they will
assuredly triumph over their enemies and attain the ultimate realization of
their political destiny. For the religious groups, this future is divinely
decreed and the terrorists themselves specifically anointed to achieve it.
(Hoffman, 1998:169)
Understanding motivations is particularly critical when dealing with secular terrorists;
who are much more dependent on the level of moral support from the national and
international community. Therefore, the criminalization of terrorism can be an effective
tool for managing the acceptable level of damage a terrorist can inflict during their
attacks while still maintaining an adequate support base. This was illustrated with the
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earlier discussion of the Real IRA bombing at Omagh (Dingley, 2001:451, 460-463;
Quillen, 2002a:281).
2.3.2.2 International Level. The international level describes the multinational
cooperation required to fight the growing threat of international terrorist organizations.
Perhaps the best example of this has been the continuing multinational coalition of over
160 nations established by the U.S. after the September 11th attacks (Office of Homeland
Security, 2002:A-1). According to U.S. Ambassador Taylor, the State Department
Coordinator for Counterterroism, “The events of 9/11 galvanized civilized nations as no
other event has; ironically, by their own hand, terrorists set in motion their own ultimate
demise” (Department of State, 2002:v). In stark contrast to previous efforts to
collectively fight terrorism, the global community has come together primarily because of
the unimaginable brutality of the September 11th attacks. For 2 years following the 1972
Palestinian attack at the Munich Olympics, the U.N. held several conferences trying to
condemn terrorism; however, the Western nations and many third world nations could
not agree on the definition of terrorism (Hoffman, 1998:31-32). Since September 11th,
2001, the U.N. has again focused its international discussions on the problem of
terrorism. Additionally, the U.N. established the Counter Terrorism Committee to
monitor the implementation of U.N. Resolution 1373, which requires nations to report
how they are fighting terrorism in seven major areas: legislation, finance, customs,
immigration, extradition, law enforcement, and arms traffic. The U.N. General Assembly
has also adopted 12 conventions on terrorism (Department of State, 2002:155).
However, the problem that plagued initial U.N. attempts to define and control terrorism is
still present today. Many of the smaller nations that condemned the September 11th
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attacks still claim that terrorism is the only way for many smaller or weaker groups, and
nations, to fight larger and/or more powerful governments. For instance, many Arab
nations, e.g., Iran, Lebanon, Syria, etc., rely on terrorism to fight Israel (Department of
State, 2002:57,65, and 68).
The U.S. decided not to wait on action from the U.N. following the September
11th attacks and led the creation of an international coalition against terrorism. While
most countries consider terrorism to be illegal, they often approach terrorism, especially
terrorism outside their borders, with a military response against terrorist groups and their
state sponsors. However, there is some evidence that military strikes against terrorism
can actually increase support and credibility to the terrorist organization from within the
group’s constituent populations (Hoffman, 1998:192-193). Therefore, the criminalization
of terrorism has produced effective ways to fight terrorist organizations without creating
as much sympathy for terrorist groups (Veness, 2001:413). The criminalization of
terrorism has also created common ground for international relations on terrorism and for
the extradition of terrorists to stand trial for their crimes (Department of State, 2002:155160). Additionally, since terrorism is a war of public psychology (Hoffman, 1998:154155; Hoffman, 2002:313), criminalizing terrorism gives the government an edge in the
media battle (Veness, 2001:413).

2.4 System Dynamics
As identified in Chapter I, system dynamics is an interdisciplinary methodology
that uses “the theory of nonlinear dynamics and feedback control” to evaluate complex
behavioral patterns (Sterman, 2000:2-4). While most modern system dynamics modeling
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efforts capitalize on more visually based modeling techniques, the heart of the
methodology comes from the use of non-linear differential equations to represent known
types of natural behavior: oscillation, first order growth or decay, etc. Because system
dynamics is interdisciplinary, it has been applied to many different dynamic systems,
both natural and man-made, ranging from “physics to physiology and psychology, from
the arms race to the war on drugs, from global climate change to organizational change”
(Sterman, 2000:901). Although the methodology has not been used in the study of
terrorism, the literature contains examples that illustrate the potential use of the system
dynamics approach to study the dynamic system of terrorism-government interaction. In
particular, the ability of system dynamics to explain an organization’s behavior and
investigate its interactions with its situational environment makes this methodology ideal
for the current research effort.
Because system dynamics can be used to study complex systems comprised of
natural and/or man-made behaviors, it helps organizational leaders understand underlying
system interactions (Wolestenholme, 1999; Barlas, Çirak, and Duman, 2000; RitchieDunham and Galván, 1999; and Barjrachrya, Ogunlana, and Bach, 2000). For the
purpose of this study these underlying system interactions will be divided into two types:
those that drive the organization and/or those that drive the situational environment in
which the organization operates. For the propose of this study, an organizational system
is defined as a complex system of man-made and/or natural interactions that occur within
the organization and that are controlled in part or full by the organizational policies
implemented by the organizational leadership. Similarly, a situational system is defined
as the complex system of man-made and natural interactions that occur outside the
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organization and where control policies provided by the organizational leadership provide
limited control of these situational behaviors. For this research, the set of complex
interactions within either the terrorist or government organization are considered
organizational systems, and the interactions between terrorist and government
organizations are more appropriately described as the situational system. Therefore, the
purpose of this study is to explore the underlying interactions between governments and
terrorist organizations that drive the system.
Because the overarching terrorist-government system interactions are between
two smaller competing systems, a significant portion of the overall system behavior can
be explained by the situational system behavior imposed by one of the smaller systems on
the other. This observation is supported by the evolution of terrorism over the last half
century; however, the following discussion is offered to further illustrate this point.
Terrorism is perhaps best viewed as the archetypal shark in the water. It
must constantly move forward to survive and indeed succeed. Although
survival entails obviating the government countermeasures designed to
unearth and destroy the terrorists and their organization, success is
dependent on overcoming the defenses and physical security barriers
designed to thwart attack. In these respects, the necessity for change in
order to stay one step ahead of the counterterrorism curve compels
terrorists to change—adjusting and adapting their tactics, modus operandi,
and sometimes even their weapons systems as needed. (Hoffman,
2002:313)
By addressing the forces of change that cause the overall situational environment to
change in favor of one of the two organizational systems, government or terrorist, one
can develop a better understanding of the overarching system. By understanding the
underlying behaviors which drive how terrorist organizations and the government interact
with each other, it is possible for the government to tailor their response to terrorist
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actions in a way that will mitigate long-term and short-term terrorist activity and dampen
the overall public threat of terrorism.
As previously stated, system dynamics has not been applied to terrorism;
however, it has been applied to human conflict, a type of situational behavior between
two opposing systems Although the study of conflict is not a major topic within the
system dynamics literature, there are two examples (Wils, Kamilya, and Choucri: 1998;
Coyle and Alexander: 1997) that demonstrate how it can be applied to the complex
system of human interaction, including conflicts between individuals, organizations, and
nations. Wils, Kamilya, and Choucri (1998) studied the effects of regional security and
stability on the environmental construct of sustainable development, which is simply an
evaluation of society’s capability to live off their environmental surroundings in a way
that does not produce a net degradation of the overall natural resources for that area. The
argument of Wils, Kamilya, and Choucri (1998) is that there is a direct link between the
level of security and stability a nation or region enjoys and their ability to establish and
maintain a sustainable level of development for their society. They base this argument on
the fact that the same underlying parameters affect both constructs; therefore, if resources
are being utilized to maintain security, then they are not being used to establish and
maintain sustainable development. They further argue that countries that do not have the
resources they require to sustain their development will place pressure on the suppliers of
those resources to maintain the security of their nation. Wils, Kamilya, and Choucri
(1998) observe that the tension developed by a resource constraint has both an internal
and external component. They further distinguish the external pressure component as a
“lateral pressure” (Wils, Kamilya, and Choucri, 1998:131).
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The Wils, Kamilya, and Choucri (1998) study formulates each of these internal
and external pressures as a function of population, technology, and resources over time.
After developing these relationships, they simulated the “lateral pressure” for different
countries around the world. From these simulations, they inferred that if the U.S. and
Europe maintain their current course, they will have to become more involved militarily
around the world to ensure their security and stability. They also inferred the types of
changes that could be made, like reducing military spending and reducing resource
consumption rates, to correct this trend and provide greater sustainability in overall world
development (Wils, Kamilya, and Choucri, 1998:153-154).
Besides using system dynamics to evaluate the underlying causes for human
conflict, system dynamics can also be used to model the overall situational environment.
Coyle and Alexander (1997) used a hypothetical drug-trade model to demonstrate the
potential advantages of the system dynamics approach to military planning and the
evaluation of complex situational systems involving human conflict between a
government and hostile organizations. Since Coyle and Alexander (1997) use a
hypothetical approach to model the problem, they stop developing the system dynamics
model at the influence diagram, which is step two of the 5-step system dynamics process
described in Chapter III. Instead of continuing with traditional systems dynamics, they
conduct a qualitative analysis of the influence diagram at several different levels of
aggregation to provide general insight into the overall system being studied. The theory
is that this deeper level of understanding by the researcher and/or the customer, in this
case the military planner, will assist them in doing a better job since they now have a
better understanding of their situational environment (Coyle and Alexander, 1997:205-
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207). As demonstrated by Coyle and Alexander (1997), a qualitative model that does not
reach the full capacity to simulate system interactions due to a lack of reliable data can
still provide individuals much needed insight into the situational environment (Coyle and
Alexander, 1997:206-207, and 213). Like the drug trade, terrorism is a relatively new
construct for government planners, both military and civilian; thus, any tools that can
help them better understand the overall situational environment and the underlying causes
of their conflict give the government a much need advantage in the “war on terror.”
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III. Methodology

3.1 Systems Dynamics Overview
System dynamics was selected as the research methodology for this study because
of its ability to model behavior patterns of complex man-made and natural systems
(Sterman, 2000:4-5). The methodology iteratively adds layers of complexity on top of
the most simplistic view of the overall system until the appropriate level of aggregation is
reached to address the question at hand (Sterman, 2000:87-88). Therefore, this research
used system dynamics as a tool to develop a model that portrays the basic behaviors of
the terrorist-government system and provides insight into some of the inherent
interactions. System dynamics models these interactions by representing the
“connections between the variables involved as a system of first-order (usually nonlinear) differential equations” (Barton and Tobias, 1998:85). The computer software
used for model simulations in this research was Stella® version 6.0 from High
Performance Systems (HPS), Inc., 2000. Stella® 6.0 utilizes graphical representations of
stocks, flows, converters, and connectors as the basic building blocks for the model
simulation (HPS, 1997:3-1).
Since terrorism is a relatively new field of study, a customer or system expert was
not available to participate in this research. Therefore, this research used an inductive
study similar to the one conducted by Coyle and Alexander (1997) and utilized an
iterative model-building approach consisting of five basic steps: problem articulation,
formulation of a dynamic hypothesis, formulation of a simulation model, testing, and
policy design and evaluation (Sterman, 2000:86). Using these five steps, a very basic
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model of the system was hypothesized and constructed. Additional detail was iteratively
added to the model until an acceptable level of detail was reached to meet the objectives
of this study. This iterative approach increases the overall confidence in the model and
allows other researchers to duplicate this research in an effort to progressively study this
complex system.

3.2 System Dynamics Step 1: Problem Articulation (Boundary Selection)
In step one, the researcher defines the problem, key behaviors, and reference
mode (Sterman, 2000: 89-91). The reference mode is a graphical illustration of how the
system behaves over time (Shelly, 2000:38; Sterman, 2000:91) and is the basis for the
development of the dynamic hypothesis in step 2 (Sterman, 2000:94-95). To illustrate
the fundamental concepts of system dynamics, a model of an individual’s retirement plan
will be used, which is unintentionally similar to the finance example from HPS (1997).
As with any retirement plan, the assumption is that a set amount of money will be
invested each month and that it will grow at some estimated rate. The reference mode,
which represents the expected behavior of the system, for such a retirement plan is shown
in Figure 3. In system dynamics, the actual values associated with the system’s behavior
is not as important as the type and magnitude of the expected behavior (Shelly, 2002:64).
For this example, one would expect first-order growth based on the interest rate.
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$

Years of Investment
Figure 3. Sample Reference Mode for Retirement Plan

3.3 System Dynamics Step 2: Formulation of a Dynamic Hypothesis
In step two, the researcher identifies the endogenous variables and exogenous
parameters required to create a causal loop diagram, or influence diagram, based on the
reference mode (Sterman, 2000:94-102). Endogenous variables are the model entities
that represent internal system forces. Exogenous parameters are the basic model
assumptions about outside forces affecting the system. Within the system dynamics field
of study, it has been established that certain system structures (as represented by
influence diagrams) correspond to a set of basic behavioral patterns over time (Sterman,
2000:107).
Continuing with the retirement plan example, the system dynamics structure for
first-order, or exponential, growth is a reinforcing loop developed by positive feedback as
shown in Figure 4 (Shelly, 2002:53; Sterman, 2000:108-109). Positive signs indicate a
reinforcing relationship between the endogenous variables, and negative signs indicate a
compensating or balancing relationship between variables. If the sum of the signs in a
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loop is positive, it is called a reinforcing loop that provides positive feedback and makes
the system behavior unstable. If the sum is negative, then it is a compensating loop that
provides negative feedback and makes the system behavior stable (Shelly, 2002:48;
Sterman, 200:142-147). A lone reinforcing loop promotes uncontrolled growth or decay,
which indicates an unstable system; similarly, a lone compensating loop provides a
dampening affect on growth or decay, thereby causing a stable system that reaches a
steady-state condition (Sterman, 2000:108-111; Shelley, 2002:48).
Using this basic understanding of system dynamics, the first-order growth for the
retirement plan is expected to be caused by a single reinforcing loop. For this example,
there are three identified endogenous variables: monthly investment increase, invested
amount, and return on investment. There are also has two exogenous parameters:
monthly investment and the interest rate. The magnitude of the increase in the
investment account is a factor of the monthly investment and the amount of interest
earned over the past month (represented by return on investment). This produces the
influence diagram shown in Figure 4.
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Figure 4. Sample Influence Diagram for Retirement Plan

3.4 System Dynamics Step 3: Formulation of a Simulation Model
In step three, the researcher transforms the influence diagram into an appropriate
flow diagram and enters the model into a computer simulation program. Key to this
portion of the process is the definition of variables, test parameters, initial conditions, and
the decision rules (Sterman, 2000:102-103). Additionally, a primary source of
confidence in the system dynamics methodology is the iterative process. Therefore, each
time an endogenous variable is added to the influence diagram, a new simulation model
is developed. As variables are added, they are referenced to other endogenous or
exogenous model parameters. This iterative process helps ensure that the definitions of
the variables are accurate and defendable.
Since Stella® uses a system of stocks and flows, the variables must be defined as
stocks, flows, or converters. A stock is any variable that accumulates, or is stockpiled,
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over time; a flow is the movement either into or out of the stock at a given rate over time;
and a converter is a variable that modifies the flow of information between variables
identified as stocks or flows (HPS, 1997:3-14). For this example, the stock is the
“Invested Amount,” the flow is the “Monthly Investment Increase,” and the converter is
“Return on Investment.” The converter is also considered an information node because it
represents the increase in the inflow rate of “Monthly Investment Increase” caused by
multiplying the magnitude of the stock, “Invested Amount,” by the exogenous variable,
“Interest Rate.” In Stella®, stocks are represented by rectangles; flows are represented
by plumbing valves; and information nodes and exogenous parameters are represented by
small circles. Thus, the corresponding model is shown in Figure 5.

Retirement Plan

Interest Rate

Return on Inv estment
Inv ested Amount

Monthly Inv estment Increase

Montly Inv estment

Figure 5. Stella® Model for Retirement Plan

3.5 System Dynamics Step 4: Testing
To validate and verify system dynamics models, Sterman (2000:845-891)
describes the 12 tests shown in Table 2. Many of these tests involve reviewing the model
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output, which is shown in Figure 6 for the retirement plan. Because of the simplicity of
this example, some of these tests are not applicable to the example; however, all but the
last one will be included in the following discussion.

Table 2. 12 Tests for System Dynamics (Sterman, 2000:859-861)
Test
Boundary
Adequacy
Structure
Assessment
Dimensional
Consistency
Parameter
Assessment
Extreme
Conditions
Integration Error
Behavior
Reproduction
Behavior Anomaly
Family Member
Surprise Behavior
Sensitivity
Analysis
System
Improvement

Location
Question
3.5.1
Does the boundary of the model encompass the
important concepts? Does a change in the
boundary significantly change the modeled
behavior?
3.5.2
Is the model structure consistent with the system?
Is the model properly aggregated? Does the
model violate any known laws of reality?
3.5.3
Do the dimensions on the right-hand side of the
variable equations match the dimensions on the
left-hand side?
3.5.4
Are the parameters consistent with the real world
knowledge of the system?
3.5.5
Does the model crash when extreme values are
used for the model parameters?
3.5.6
Is the modeled behavior sensitive to a reduction in
the time interval by half?
3.5.7
Does the model reproduce the behavior that is
observed in reality? Do the frequency and phase
of the model match the real system?
3.5.8
Do changes in the model assumptions produce
anomalies in the model behavior?
3.5.9
Does the model produce behavior that is
consistent with similar systems to the one being
studied?
3.5.10
Does the model account for previously
unobserved behavior or novel system conditions?
3.5.11
Is the model sensitive to numerical, behavioral, or
policy changes in the model settings?
Not used “Did the modeling process help change the
in this
system for the better?”
study.
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Figure 6. Model Response for Retirement Plan

3.5.1 Boundary Adequacy. For this test, the researcher defines the boundary of
the current model and determines if it is appropriate for the research question. The
boundary is where the endogenous model variables stop and exogenous model
parameters begin. When a model variable is established as a constant, it is actually an
exogenous model parameter. Therefore, this test relies on the judgment of the researcher
and the customer to determine the level of detail required for the boundary. If the
research team determines that a key model feedback mechanism is not included within
the model boundary, then the boundary must be reset (Sterman, 2000:861-862). For the
retirement plan example, the current model boundary is shown by the dotted line in
Figure 7; note that the boundary includes the endogenous variables identified earlier.
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Figure 7. Model Boundary for Retirement Plan

3.5.2 Structure Assessment. The structure assessment test, similar to the
boundary adequacy test, addresses the required level of detail for the model. However, it
compares the actual model structure with reality to determine if the model violates any
“real world” laws or rules, such as the laws of physics or negative modeling numbers for
things that cannot be negative in reality (e.g., “water flowing uphill”) (Sterman,
2000:863-864). For the retirement plan example, the model structure follows what is
found in the real world.
3.5.3 Dimensional Consistency. “Dimensional consistency is one of the most
basic tests and should be among the first you do” (Sterman, 2000:866). Dimensional
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consistency addresses the question, “Do the units of measure on the left-hand side of the
mathematical equation match the units of measure on the right hand side of the
equation?” If the units do not correspond, the equation is not valid. For the retirement
plan example, a quick mathematical check shows the model maintains dimensional
consistency.
3.5.4 Parameter Assessment. A key factor in the success of any modeling effort
is the proper delineation of model parameters. Because system dynamics models
behaviors, traditional statistical assessment of some parameters may not be possible.
“In practice, statistical and judgmental methods are used together.
Knowledge of the real system constrains the plausible range for many
parameters; statistical estimation provides a check on the judgmental
estimates.” (Sterman, 2000:867)
For the retirement plan example, the parameters could be debated but are effective for the
purposes of the model. An example of a non-plausible parameter is a fixed interest rate
for a retirement investment account over 30 years. An individual can get a fixed interest
rate for this period of time when borrowing money, but most investment accounts have
variable interest rates over long periods of time.
3.5.5 Extreme Conditions. In its most basic terms, the extreme conditions test
validates that the model does not crash when it reaches either the upper or lower
boundary of the model. There are two types of extreme condition tests: equation tests
and simulation tests (Sterman, 2000:869). For this example, there is no upper boundary
and the lower boundary is zero, so the model does not violate this test.
3.5.6 Integration Error. Because system dynamics uses first-order equations to
model complex behaviors, the interval of time over which the simulation iterations are
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conducted, typically referred to as delta time (DT), is an important factor of the
simulation process. If a 50 percent reduction in the interval of time causes a significant
change in the model, the initial time interval is considered too large. If the time interval
can be reduced by 50 percent without significantly affecting the model, the time interval
is considered appropriate (Sterman, 2000:872). The example passed this test.
3.5.7 Behavior Reproduction. The behavior reproduction test validates whether
the model produces behavior similar to the “real world” system being studied. For
systems with measurable behavior and existing or collectable data, statistical methods can
be used to measure the variance of the model from the real system (Sterman; 2000: 874880). For the retirement plan example, the model output was shown in Figure 6; as the
figure shows, the model output follows the expected real-world behavior.
3.5.8 Behavior Anomaly. The behavior anomaly test validates the structure of
the model by examining the system’s behavior when a targeted system relationship is
removed. The greater the behavior anomalies created by this targeted elimination, the
more important that targeted relationship is to the model. A common method of
accomplishing this is the “loop knockout analysis” technique in which each loop within
the system is systematically targeted (Sterman, 2000: 880-881). The retirement plan
example only has one loop, so the “loop-knockout analysis” cannot be preformed.
3.5.9 Family Member. The family member test validates the generality of the
model by examining if the model can be applied to similar systems with different
parameter values (Sterman, 2000:881). For the retirement plan example, the model could
be applied to any investment that had a fixed rate of return over the same time period.
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3.5.10 Surprise Behavior. When the model output and the research expectations
based on real-world data do not match, it normally is an indicator of flaws in either the
formal model diagram or the mental model. The formal model is the model being tested;
the mental model is the perceived model in the minds of the researcher and the customer
of the system. The surprise behavior test validates the model by demonstrating system
behaviors that are not “previously recognized” but actually do occur in the natural system
(Sterman, 2000:882). This is a critical point in helping researchers develop a better
understanding of the overall system. The simplicity of the example does not lend itself to
this test.
3.5.11 Sensitivity Analysis. All models are sensitive to changes in their
assumptions. System dynamics modeling has three main types of sensitivity: numerical,
behavioral, and policy. Numerical sensitivity addresses how much the model output will
change based on small changes in model parameters. Behavioral sensitivity addresses
changes in the behavior patterns of the model. Finally, policy sensitivity addresses the
effectiveness of various system-control policies (Sterman 2000:883). As before, the
simplicity of the example does not require the use of this test.

3.6 System Dynamics Step 5: Policy Design and Evaluation
The last step of the process before starting another iteration determines if all the
necessary real-world conditions of the system have been modeled or if significant realworld system behaviors have been unaccounted for in the current model. It also
identifies what policy controls need to be implemented by management for better control
of the system. In this step, the researcher determines if the model complexity satisfies the
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scope of the research endeavor or if another layer of complexity is required. If the model
is acceptable and valid, the researcher identifies policy changes to help control the
system. For any identified policy changes, another simulation iteration of the model is
conducted. Once an acceptable and valid model is obtained with the desired policy
controls in place to manage the system, the process is complete (Sterman, 2000:103-104).
For the retirement plan example, suppose the goal is to have $100,000 at the time
of retirement. As the account balance nears this amount, suppose the individual decided
to base the monthly deposit on a percentage of the goal attained. If that were the case, the
reference mode would be an S-shaped curve that approaches steady-state at $100,000, as
shown in Figure 8, instead of uncontrolled first order growth. For this S-shaped reference
mode, a compensating loop with a goal-seeking structure would be added to the influence
diagram as shown in Figure 9. The corresponding model output from Stella® is shown in
Figure 10.

$

Years of Investment
Figure 8. Revised Sample Reference Mode for Retirement Plan
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Figure 10. Revised Stella® Model and Output for Retirement Plan

3.7 Summary
Based on these examples, the expectations for Chapter IV should be clear. The
model for the system of terrorist–government interactions will be developed from its
most aggregated view (similar to Figure 1) to a less aggregated level that meets the
objectives of the study. It is expected that the number of overall iterations will be large;
however, given the unique nature of this research, it is unlikely that this effort will
develop far enough along to incorporate some type of policy development as described in
step 5.
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IV. Results and Analysis

This study was designed to examine how the interactions between terrorist and
government forces form a dynamic system of action and reaction. It was also designed to
determine how the government might be able to affect the behavior of this system
through various types of policy controls. To keep the scope at a manageable level, this
study examines only the basic interactions of the overall system at an aggregate level.
This was quantified by two objectives: (1) attempt to identify the primary interactions
between terrorist organizations and the government by iteratively disaggregating the
model boundary and (2) provide insight into how the system behaves.
These objectives were met by applying the iterative system dynamics
methodology described in Chapter III, which resulted in five distinct modeling efforts
identified as model series 1 through 5. Table 3 provides a brief description of the five
modeling series and a brief summary of their basic results. This section provides
discussion about these five model series and the major decision points used in the
modeling process. The remainder of the chapter reviews the sensitivity analysis of
selected model parameters and the impact on the overall final model.
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Table 3. Summary of the Five Modeling Series
Model
Series
#1

Number of
Models
10

Iterations

#2

3

3

#3

5

5

#4

11

11

#5

4

4

2

System
Structure
Overshoot and
Collapse
Oscillation

Focus
Result
Area
Overall
Abandoned for
Model
Series 2, 3 & 5
Daily
Used in Series
Interactions
5
Overshoot and Significant Abandoned for
Collapse
Event
Series 4
Oscillation with Significant Used in Series
Goal-Seeking
Event
5
Combination of
Overall
Final Model
2&4
Model

4.1 Model Series 1.
This model series was based on the original hypothesized reference mode shown
in Figure 11. This hypothesis was derived from the mental model of the system
identified in Figure 1, which shows that the government reacts to the perceived actions of
the terrorist group and that in turn the terrorist group reacts to the perceived actions of the
government. Based on this mental model, the reference mode in Figure 11 was created as
an oscillatory behavior between terrorist activity (TA) and government activity (GA). As
terrorist activity increases, government activity also increases; however, there is a time
lag, or phase shift in the oscillation, for the government activity. As government activity
increases, the terrorist activity decreases as they attempt to evade the government’s
actions. The original hypothesis shown in Figure 11 assumes a sinusoidal oscillation.
However, it was hypothesized that the terrorist group operated with some limited
resource base. Therefore, when they attacked, the resulting depletion of the resource
would cause a drastic drop in the terrorist’s capability to conduct activities.
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Figure 11. Hypothesized Terrorist Reference Mode
TA – Terrorist activity and GA – Government activity

Based on this revised hypothesis, an overshoot and collapse structure was selected
for the associated influence diagram. The overshoot and collapse structure in system
dynamics models an activity that is dependent on some secondary resource. If that
supporting resource is driven to zero, then the supported activity must also be zero. A
classic example would be the ability of a natural habitat to support a given animal
species; if that animal consumes too much of the natural resources, then the population of
the species will drop to a population level that the environment can support.
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After partially developing model series 1, it was determined that the hypothesized
reference mode for the model was not completely accurate. It was determined that some
terrorist activities were operating independent of the supporting terrorist resources
required for a significant terrorist attack. These actions were classified as the daily
activities required for an organization to function properly. The realization that the
terrorist side of the mental model might actually have two distinct behaviors driven by
two separate sub-systems within the larger system led to a revised hypothesis for the
overall reference mode. As shown in Figure 12, the revised reference mode consisted of
one reference mode based on terrorist daily activity (TDA) and another based on terrorist
significant events (TSE). The sum of these two behaviors drive the responding
government activity (GA); therefore, a portion of the government response can be
attributed to each sub-system on the terrorist side of the equation. Because of these
reevaluations, model series 1 was abandoned and two separate approaches were used to
determine the most appropriate reference mode and model structure.

75

Figure 12. Revised Hypothesized Terrorist Reference Mode with Component
Reference Modes
TDA – Terrorist daily activity, TSE – Terrorist Significant Event and GA – Government
activity

4.2 Model Series 2.
The development of model series 2 was based on the terrorist daily activity
reference mode shown in Figure 13. From the basic oscillating structure between
government activity and daily terrorist activity, this series was iteratively developed in a
very systematic approach. To demonstrate the iterative process used during the
development of the model series, the steps used to create the models in model series 2
will be discussed. The first iterative model in this series was called model 2A. For
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additional reference, the entire final model for this series, Model 2C, is included in
Appendix A.
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Figure 13. Model Series 2 Reference Mode
TDA –Terrorist Daily Activity and GA – Government Activity

4.2.1 Step 1. The first step in any system dynamics modeling effort is to define
the reference mode, shown in Figure 13. Because the government activity is based solely
on the terrorist daily activity, the resulting government activity will be similar to the
terrorist daily activity; the only differences are in the magnitude of the activity and a
phase shift to indicate that government activity lags terrorist activity. One of the biggest
issues in developing the reference mode was determining how to measure activity;
therefore, all activities were transformed to a level of daily spending in U.S. dollars.
Initially, the focus was on the relative magnitudes of the dollar values rather than the
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actual dollar amounts. This was based in part on the fact that it was unclear which model
variables and parameters needed to be defined immediately.
4.2.2 Step 2. The next step in the system dynamics modeling effort is to
determine the influence diagram required to produce the behavior shown in the reference
mode. The standard influence diagram associated with oscillating behaviors consists of
two stock-flow combinations in which the quantity of one stock drives the inflow of the
opposite stock, and the quantity of the second stock drives the outflow of the first stock.
For this model series, the respective influence diagram is shown in Figure 14. Note that
the daily activities of the terrorist cause an increase in government spending, which
reinforces the amount of government expenditures. As government expenditures
increase, it is expected that this will cause terrorist activity and expenditures to decrease.
The endogenous variables for this initial model are the respective increase and
decrease in the daily expenditures by both the terrorist group and the government. The
exogenous model parameters for the initial model are growth, government effectiveness,
and loss rate for the terrorist side of the model; and maintenance rate, conversion factor,
and pressure for the government side of the model. The endogenous variable of terrorist
spending is driven by the exogenous parameter of growth, which states that the terrorist
daily expenditures will increase each day at some rate of growth. For this level of detail,
the parameter of growth is assumed to be fixed. The terrorist decrease in spending is a
function of the amount of terrorist expenditures lost due to organizational inefficiencies
as represented by the parameter loss rate and the effectiveness of government operations
against terrorist’s assets as represented by the parameter government effectiveness. In
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both cases, these efficiency rates are multiplied by the respective level of activity to
determine that actual decrease in terrorist spending.
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Figure 14. Model 2A Influence Diagram

On the government side of the model, the government increase in spending is
based on the effectiveness of terrorist actions against the government, or the perceived
threat posed by the terrorist group, and the required daily activities required to maintain
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the organizational structure of the government counterterrorism activities. The terrorist
effectiveness is a function of the terrorist daily expenditures and the conversion factor
which determines the level of threat posed by the group based on the level of their
activities. The maintenance activities required to maintain governmental organization is
based on a level of government activity multiplied by a maintenance rate. Both
parameters, conversion factor and maintenance rate, are assumed to be fixed for this
model. Finally, the government decrease in spending is based on the political pressure to
spend the money in another sector of government activity. This is function of the level of
government activity and the corresponding pressure parameter, which is assumed to be
constant for this model.
4.2.3 Step 3. Once the influence diagram was determined, it was converted with
the Stella® simulation software into the flow diagram shown in Figure 15. Estimated
values were assigned for the starting points of the endogenous stock variables and for the
exogenous parameters because of the extremely high level of model aggregation and the
fact that detailed numerical data on the subject was limited. The associated simulation
behavior is shown in Figure 16, which clearly displays the oscillatory nature of the
system. Although the initial spike was not an expected behavior of the model, the
sinusoidal oscillation agrees with the reference mode.
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4.2.4 Step 4. From the information developed in steps 1 through 3, limited testing
was performed on the initial model with some of the 12 tests identified in Chapter III.
These tests helped determine how much additional detail was needed to more fully
develop model series 2.
4.2.4.1 Boundary Adequacy Test. As stated in Chapter III, this test relies on the
judgment of the researcher to determine the required level of detail to properly define the
system boundary. For this test, the focus is on the influence diagram in Figure 14, which
is a very basic representation of the system. However, the exogenous parameters are
vague and do not provide any real help in studying the system. The endogenous variables
are simple and directly related to the exogenous parameters with no internal feedback
loops in the system. Therefore, it is clear that additional levels of detail are required to
disaggregate the model to a more useful scope for this research. It might seem that this
first iteration was too simple; however, this iterative process of building the model from
its simplest form to a much more complex system builds confidence in the final model.
4.2.4.2 Structure Assessment Test. The focus of this test is on determining
whether the model violates any real-world system conditions or laws. Addressing the
three questions listed in Table 2 from Chapter III, the structure of the model is consistent
with the system as understood at a very high level of aggregation. The model does not
violate any natural laws, such as Newton’s laws of physics or other commonly accepted
laws of reality. However, as identified in Section 4.2.4.1, the level of aggregation is so
high that model is not very useful in understanding the primary interactions between
terrorist and government forces. Therefore, the model needs additional levels of detail to
make it more applicable to the problem.
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4.2.4.3 Dimensional Consistency. Dimensional consistency must be applied to all
models. For model 2A, there are two stock equations and four flow equations; the actual
equations from the Stella® program are shown in Figure 17. The units of measure for the
stocks and flows are U.S. dollars per day and U.S. dollars per day2, respectively. The
dimensions for the exogenous parameters (conversion factor, maintenance rate, pressure,
government effectiveness, growth, and loss rate) are a unitless percentage or efficiency
on a per day basis. The resulting calculations on both sides of the equation result in the
appropriate units ($/day2). The calculations for all model equations produced the proper
results to satisfy this test. For the remainder of this document, dimensional consistency
will be discussed only if it is violated by one of the models and cannot be explained
and/or corrected.
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Figure 17. Equations for Model 2A

4.2.4.4 Parameter Assessment. Parameter assessment focuses on the proper
delineation of the model parameters. Because the parameters for this research are
extremely aggregated, educated estimates were used as model parameter values. As the
system boundary is expanded and additional levels of detail are added, the model
parameters will change and reflect new educated estimates. Section 4.6 covers the
parameter assessment for the overall final model and includes a sensitivity analysis of
selected model parameters.
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4.2.4.5 Behavior Reproduction Test. Behavior reproduction validates whether the
proposed model produces behavior similar to the real-world system being studied.
Although Figure 16 does not identically match the hypothesized reference mode, it
produces the initial oscillatory behavior exhibited by terrorist-government interactions
and the lag in government actions. However, the frequency of the oscillations is
debatable. The perceived reality is that the frequency would be smaller over a fixed
period of time. This perceived reality is based on the fact that we are looking at terrorist
daily activities, which for a full-time international terrorist would be close to steady state
with fluctuations in activity based on the level of government activity. This is possible
since many terrorist organizations, such as Al Qaeda, attempt to cover up their daily
activities in order to hinder the efforts of government forces. As additional levels of
model detail are added, the oscillations should smooth out to more closely resemble the
overall expectations. These additional levels of detail include better definitions of the
endogenous variables and exogenous parameters.
4.2.4.6 Surprise Behavior Test. The surprise behavior test for the model is
reflected in Figure 16, which demonstrates the terrorist behavior spiking before the
government behavior. Figure 16 also shows that the first spike was the largest. These
behaviors have been observed in real-world events. Recall from Chapter II that the start
of modern terrorism was the 1968 Palestinian hijacking of an Israeli airliner. However,
structured government counterterrorism response did not occur until after the terrorist
attacks at the 1972 Munich Olympics (Hoffman, 1998:72-73). In other words, terrorists
are typically instigators and benefit from the element of surprise, while the government is
typically in a reactionary mode. This can also explain the disparity in the first spike as
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compared to the following oscillations. If the government operates a consistent
counterterrorism policy, it is assumed that the initial terrorist daily activity will be
greatest before the government’s attention has been focused on that particular terrorist
group.
However, this assumption is flawed because it does not take into account many
other factors that account for terrorist daily activity. First of all, it assumes that terrorist
activity is only affected by the actions of one government, which is not always the case.
Second, it does not account for non-governmental constraints placed on terrorist groups,
such as the needs or requirements of the terrorist’s sponsors. These flaws will not be
addressed in this study. However, other flaws in the assumption will be addressed by the
iterative development of the overall model.
4.2.5 Step 5. Step 5, described in Chapter III as policy design and evaluation,
was not addressed with model 2A since the decision was made to modify the model
before it reached this step. As previously mentioned, step 5 was not a major portion of
this study. Instead, it will be left to later research, since the motivation of this study is to
define the existing system. However, the sensitivity discussed in Section 4.6 will
demonstrate how Step 5 can be applied to policy development once better data has been
acquired for the model.
4.2.6 Additional Iterations of Model. The final two models in model series 2
are called model 2B and model 2C. Model 2 B is covered in Section 4.2.6.1, while model
2C is covered in Section 4.2.6.2.
4.2.6.1 Model 2B. Model 2B builds on model 2A by examining an additional
level of detail for the effect of government activities on terrorist activities. The major
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assumption in model 2B was that there are three types of government activity: offensive
action, defensive action, and intelligence action. The level of government spending for
each of these actions is based on three new exogenous model parameters: government
counterterrorism operations (GCTO) coefficient, government defensive (GD) coefficient,
and government intelligence (GI) coefficient.
This breakout of government action caused a major change in the model by
shifting the government effectiveness from an exogenous parameter to an endogenous
variable and creating a mirror image variable called terrorist effectiveness. The new
government effectiveness variable is based on government counterterrorism operations
and government intelligence, where government intelligence is expressed as an efficiency
of government action based on how much the government spends to learn about terrorist
actions. The terrorist effectiveness variable is used to calculate how much terrorist
activity is thwarted by government defensive actions.
This model introduces a new type of Stella® variable, the graphic variable. In a
graphic variable, the Y-axis represents the value of the variable and the X-axis is the
criteria by which the variable is measured. Model 2B introduces two graphical variables:
government defense and government intelligence. Both variables are considered to be a
percentage, are bound by values between 0 and 1, and have a near S-shaped behavior as
shown in Figure 18.
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Figure 18. Model 2B Graphical Variables

The government defense variable represents the percentage of daily terrorist
activity that is interrupted by government defensive actions based on how much
government activity is spent on this variable. The lower bound of this variable is zero; if
the government spends nothing on defense, it cannot interrupt terrorist activities. The
upper bound is set at 0.8 since the government cannot intercept all terrorist activity,
regardless of how much time or money they spend on defense.
Similarly, the government intelligence variable measures how effective
government activity is based on how much the government knows about terrorist actions,
which is dependent on how much the government spends on terrorism. The idea behind
this variable is that if the government knows 50% of the terrorist daily activities, then
only 50% of the government activities, offensive or defensive, will be effective. The rest
of the government activity is considered to be ineffective. The range of the government
intelligence variable is set from 0.165 to 0.8; if the government spends nothing on
intelligence, it will have some minimal knowledge of terrorist activity based on nongovernmental sources of intelligence, news services, etc. However, regardless of how
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much the government spends on intelligence, it is relatively impossible for the
government to have full knowledge of terrorist activities.
Model 2B consists of two sub-models to isolate the effects of offensive and
defensive actions, as shown in Figure 19. Both sub-models include an associated
government intelligence term and were developed to examine the individual effects of the
respective system dynamics structures on the simulation output. The additional causal
loop added by government defensive actions resulted in the reduction of the oscillation
amplitude and the separation between oscillations as shown in Figure 20, which is
expected due to the nature of the defensive actions. The refinement of an existing causal
loop added by government offensive actions resulted in a significant reduction in the
frequency of oscillation but a significant increase in the amplitude of the oscillation when
compared to the output of the government defensive actions. This makes sense since the
government defensive actions are intercepting actual terrorists daily actions.
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Figure 19. Model 2B Sub-models
Top – Model 2B1; Bottom – Model 2B2
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Figure 20. Model 2B Sub-models Outputs
Top – Model 2B1; Bottom – Model 2B2

4.2.6.2 Model 2C. Model 2C added the same level of detail to the terrorist daily
activity side that model 2B added to the government side and introduced two new
variables and three new parameters. The two variables were terrorist operations and
terrorist intelligence. Using the same justifications used in model 2B, the terrorist
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activities were broken out into terrorist operations and intelligence actions. A terrorist
defensive action was not created, because there was no apparent need for it; however, this
will be corrected in later model series. The terrorist intelligence variable is almost
identical to the government intelligence variable. It also utilized an S-shaped graphical
variable, but the range was changed to a minimum value of 0.25 and a maximum value of
0.9. The minimum and maximum values are higher for the terrorist groups as compared
to the government since it is much harder for governments to hide their counterterrorism
activities. The variable terrorist operations encompassed all terrorist daily activities
except terrorist intelligence.
The three parameters added in model 2C are the two coefficients determining
terrorist’s expenditures on terrorist operations and terrorist intelligence and a
quantification of the old conversion factor which was changed to the terrorist
amplification factor, which accounts for the return on investment terrorists get for their
operational activity. If a terrorist spends $1/day on operational activity, the actual value
of the activity observed by the government is $100/day.

As seen in Chapter II, this

amplifying factor has been increasing in recent years with the average damage and death
per attack steadily increasing (Medd and Goldstien, 1997; Quillen, 2002a). Model 2C
resulted in the Stella® model and simulation output shown in Figures 21 and 22,
respectively.
The simulation output shown in Figure 22 reflects the initial spike explained with
model 2A. However, the following terrorist and government actions reach steady-state
oscillations with a distinct difference in the average amount of action from each
respective entity. As identified in Chapter II, this behavior was expected since the
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terrorists have the advantage of surprise and target selection. These advantages force the
government to work harder on defensive measures than the terrorists have to work on
offensive measures. Based on these evaluations of the model simulations, the decision
was made that model 2C displayed an acceptable level of aggregation for terrorist daily
activity for this point in the overall modeling process.
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Figure 21. Model 2C Stella® Model
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Figure 22. Model 2C Graphical Output

4.3 Model Series 3
Model series 3 was the first attempt at modeling terrorist significant events, i.e.,
specific terrorist activities associated with conducting significant terrorist attacks. For
this study, significant terrorist attacks are considered to be large-scale attacks similar to
Quillen’s (2002a) mass casualty attacks but without the defined categorization limit (e.g.,
at least 25 fatalities). This model series hypothesized that terrorist significant events
were based on an overshoot and collapse structure in which the terrorist had to acquire a
resource base before they could execute their attacks. After five iterations of this model
series, the determination was made that the goal-seeking growth of model series 4 would
be a more accurate representation of the system behavior. However, many of the lessons
learned in model series 3 were carried over into the development of model series 4. Most
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notable of these was the realization that certain terrorist daily activities support terrorist
significant event activities. While this is intuitive in real-world events, it is more
complicated in the modeling process and required further disaggregation of model 2C.

4.4 Model Series 4
The goal-seeking structure used in model series 4 was designed to match the
reference mode shown in Figure 23. The simulation output for the associated goalseeking structure reaches a desired steady state solution as shown in Figure 24. The
theory for model series 4 was that the terrorist organization, as with any modern
organization, had some operational goal they were striving to achieve. The goal-seeking
structure utilizes a parameter which establishes the goal, a stock, a flow, and a converter
variable that measures the difference between the goal and the stock.
Two assumptions were used to modify this basic goal-seeking structure in the
development of model series 4. First, it was assumed that the terrorist would initiate a
significant event attack as soon as they had stockpiled the required resources. This would
cause the significant terrorist activities to drop to zero and restart the cycle, thereby
creating an oscillatory behavior where the basic system dynamics oscillatory structure
does not exist. Second, it was assumed that the more resources the terrorist had
stockpiled, the greater their ability to accumulate additional resources. This feedback
loop to the stock created an S-shaped growth of the resource stock. For additional
reference, the entire final model for this series, model 4K1, is included in Appendix B.
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The first three iterations of model series 4 (4A, 4B, and 4C) focused solely on
producing the desired goal-seeking behavior for the terrorist significant event portion of
the reference mode. After determining an adequate goal-seeking structure, eight more
iterations (4D-4K1) were conducted to add government interactions and additional levels
of detail, thereby creating a combined model.

4.4.1 Goal-Seeking Structure. As identified earlier, it was hypothesized that the
terrorist had a set number of activities that had to be accomplished for the attack to be
executed and considered successful. This premise served as the foundation for the basic
goal-seeking structure, which is shown as model 4A2A in Figure 25. This structure
consisted of four parameters and three variables. The four parameters were momentum,
initial inflow rate, goal-discrepancy (GD) flow rate, and the goal. The three variables
were significant event (SE) resource expenditures, resource acquisition, and percent of
goal.

Figure 25. Stella® Model 4A2A
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The stock, significant event resource expenditures, is influenced only by the flow,
resource acquisition. The flow is a function of the percent of goal, the goal-discrepancy
flow rate, the stock, the momentum, and the initial flow rate. The flow is determined by
the sum of the flow factors times one minus the percent of goal. The goal-discrepancy
flow rate is the flow factor initially; at this point, it is assumed to be a constant parameter.
However, later in the overall model development, it will a variable of daily terrorist
activity. The momentum rate is based on the second assumption above that the more
resources that are stockpiled the greater the terrorist ability to acquire additional
resources. The one minus the percent of goal term slows down the flow and turns it off
as the resource expenditures reach the required goal. The percent of goal variable simply
divided the level of the stock by the goal to measure the percent of goal that had been
attained by the terrorist. The overall result is the goal-seeking behavior shown in Figure
26.

Figure 26. Model 4A2A Stella® Output

99

Model 4B, shown in Figure 27, built on model 4A2A by adding a mechanistic
outflow to the system to indicate that the terrorist would initiate an attack when they got
within an acceptable percentage of their goal. The outflow is an “If-Then-Else”
statement that monitors the percent of goal variable to determine when it reaches the
acceptable level identified in the minimum percent required parameter. When the percent
of goal is equal to or exceeds the minimum percent required the outflow equals the value
of the stock. However, if the DT as defined in Chapter III is less than 1, the outflow will
not be able to completely empty the stock. Since this outflow empties the stock when the
acceptable level of the goal is reached, this immediately restarts the process of acquiring
additional significant event resources and produces the “false” oscillation shown in
Figure 28. This figure illustrates the oscillation created by the system’s constant desire to
attain the desired goal but always being reset to zero just before it can reach that goal.

Figure 27. Stella® Model 4B1
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Figure 28. Stella® Model 4A2A Output

In system dynamic terms, this oscillation is considered to be false because it is not
being driven by an oscillation system dynamics structure similar to the structure of model
2A in Figure 14. Intsead, this oscillation is being driven by the mechanistic outflow.
Although this models real-world conditions in an acceptable manner, if the researcher
does not account for the behavioral effects of this mechanistic outflow in the evaluation
of the final model, the researcher can mistakenly credit model oscillation to a dominant
causal loop structure instead of the mechanistic outflow. By identifying the oscillation as
false, the researcher can avoid misinterpretations as to the causes of the oscillatory
behavior.
Overall, this mechanistic outflow was a source of trouble throughout the rest of the
modeling process because of the type of mechanistic structure and the DT. These
limitations were later identified and corrected in model series 5. The structure problem is
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caused by the fact that the same goal driving the inflow also drives the outflow. In later
models when government actions start to erode terrorist resources, it becomes impossible
to simulate a significant event execution, even though common sense says that the
terrorists will try to attack early, postpone the attack, or redirect the attack in order to
prevent the government from taking their significant event capability away. These issues
will be addressed in detail as they arise.
Model 4C1, shown in Figure 29, disaggregated model 4B1 to a level acceptable to
the overall model and to show how the two terrorist sectors of the model interact before
the government interaction with the terrorist significant event was included. Because one
large parameter was exchanged for four smaller parameters, this iteration had no
significant impact on the development of model series 4. However, this change is
expected to have a significant impact in the overall model development because it ties the
two terrorist sectors of the larger model together. These activity inflow terms are
exogenous model parameters in the model series 4 simulations but are actually part of the
endogenous variable terrorist operations from model series 2. This makes them
endogenous variables of the overall model. This interaction between the two sectors of
the model is corrected in model series 5 when the two model series (2 and 4) are merged.
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Figure 29. Model 4C1 Basic Terrorist Significant Event Structure

4.4.2 Goal-Seeking combined with Government Interactions. Models 4D
through 4K add government interactions to the terrorist significant event model structure
and iteratively develop the interactions between the two model sectors. These models
provide a greater level of detail regarding the interactions between terrorist daily activity,
terrorist significant event, and the government. While the government side of the model
is very similar to that for model series 2, the following concepts were added: terrorist
impact, terrorist visibility, and government political will. The process for developing
each of the models is identical to the process previously described. Therefore, only a
brief summary of each model’s contribution to the overall development of model series 4
will be provided with a detailed look at variable and parameter interactions and the
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overall output of model 4K1. The model structure discussion regarding models 4D
through 4K are referenced in Figure 30.

Figure 30. Stella® Model 4K1

Model 4D2 added the basic interactions from the government sector model
structure, which were developed in model 2A and described in Section 4.2, to the terrorist
significant event sector of the model. To accommodate these new system interactions, a
second outflow was added to the significant event resource expenditures stock to simulate
resources lost because of government action. This kept the resources used in significant
event execution, the mechanistic outflow, as a separate model entity. Model 4D2 also
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added the new concept of significant event percent of government action as a new model
parameter. This new parameter recognizes the reality that the total amount of
government action has to be split between the terrorist significant event and terrorist daily
activity sectors of the model. The most significant impact from model 4D2 was the
model output. The structure created by the addition of government interactions created a
dampened oscillation which approached steady state as shown in Figure 31. This
provides hope that when the model is fully developed and properly parameterized a
government policy can be created to control the overall system behavior. Figure 31 has
been limited to the first 120 days of the 365-day model run since these days include the
vast majority of the oscillations.
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Figure 31. Stella ® Model 4D2 Output
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Model 4E1 and model 4F1 refined model 4D2 by breaking out government
actions in the same way that model 2B broke out these actions. In order to facilitate the
merger of model series 2, the parameters and graphical variables for models 4E1 and 4F1
were set to match the same parameters and variables used in model 2C. Model 4F1
demonstrated that the government actions to the terrorist significant event resource stock
were actually the result of the government’s visibility of these terrorist actions and not
necessarily the efficiency of these actions. These realizations led to the development of
model 4G2, which added a variable for terrorist visibility and a parameter for terrorist
defensive actions. The justification for these additions is from the Chapter II discussion
that terrorist groups, such as Al Qaeda, actively try to hide their preparation activities
from the government to ensure operational security.
Model 4H1 expands on model 4G2 by adding the actual terrorist attack to the
model. The attack variable is identified as terrorist significant event (TSE) impact, which
is based on the amount of terrorist significant event resources utilized in the event
execution. It also includes a new parameter for impact coefficient to determine the
expected rate of return for terrorists from a terrorist significant event attack. Terrorists
enjoy a significant rate of return for the amount of damage they inflict compared to the
damage that is inflicted on the government or society.
Model 4I1 reintroduces the government defensive actions that were initially added
during model 4F1 but removed for model 4G2. The terms used for government defense
are identical to those developed in model 2B. In model 4I1, the government defense is
used as mitigation term in figuring the variable of TSE impact. Similar to model 2B, the
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government defense graphic variable is expressed as an efficiency of the terrorist impact
by indicating the percentage of terrorist actions foiled by government defensive actions.
Models 4J1 and 4K1 expand upon model 4I1 by introducing the idea of political
will to the model series 4 development. Initially, political will was defined by two
variables, one for positive political will and one for negative political will. Positive
political will uses TSE impact and a step function to calculate the political will of
governmental leaders to increase spending for terrorism based on the severity of a
significant terrorist attack. The negative political will calculates the erosion of political
will based on the lack of significant terrorist attacks. The idea of political will and how
to model it was refined later in model series 5.
This iterative process for models series 4 culminated in the development of model
4K1, which is shown in Figure 30; its associated simulation output is shown in Figure 32.
Overall, each iteration improved the model output; however, as each level of detail was
added, it became more difficult to simulate the significant event execution. Despite this
difficulty, the overall level of model detail was considered appropriate for this point in
the modeling process.
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Figure 32. Stella® Model 4K1 Output

To summarize, model 4K1 has 7 endogenous variables and 6 exogenous
parameters in the terrorist significant event sector of the model, as well as 5 exogenous
parameters from the terrorist daily activity. A key difference between model series 2 and
model series 4 is that the terrorist significant event (TSE) flows are in $/day and the stock
is in U.S. dollars. The stock is significant event (SE) resource expenditure supported by
the resource acquisition inflow, the event execution outflow, and the resource loss rate
outflow. The stock has two outflows to distinguish the difference between the loss of
resource due to a significant event execution and resource loss rate due to government
actions.
The resource acquisition inflow is driven by the goal-discrepancy (GD) flow rate,
percent of goal, and the SE resource expenditure stock variables, as well as the
parameters for momentum and initial flow rate. The GD flow rate variable is the
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summation of the terrorist daily activities that support the TSE preparations as
represented by five parameters: terrorist intelligence, terrorist logistics, terrorist training,
terrorist planning, and terrorist defensive actions. The percent of goal variable monitors
the difference between the set goal for the SE resource stock and the actual level of the
stock. As the stock approaches the set goal, the acquisition of resources is slowed.
The two TSE outflows interact with the government sector of the model. The
resource loss rate is affected by the amount of direct government actions applied against
the TSE stock and is calculated from the product of the government effectiveness
variable and the SE percent of government action parameter. The SE execution outflow
was described in the earlier discussion of model series 4. The SE execution drives the
TSE impact variable, which calculates the damage caused by an attack based on the
government defensive measures and on the impact coefficient parameter. The TSE
impact variable is a player in the total terrorist impact and the driver for the government
variable of political will.
The government sector has 10 variables and 6 parameters. The government stock
is government daily spending with an inflow of government spending increase and an
outflow of government spending decrease. The government spending increase is driven
by the variables TSE impact, terrorist visibility, positive political will, and the
government daily expenditures; it is also driven by the maintenance parameter. The
spending decrease structure is driven by the negative political will and government daily
spending variables and the political pressure parameter.
Government daily spending drives threes types of government actions: defense,
counterterrorism operations, and intelligence. The government defensive action and
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government intelligence are graphical variables which were discussed in Section 4.2.3.
The government counterterrorism operations are offensive actions taken against the
terrorists. The combination of these parameters with government intelligence forms the
government effectiveness variable which determines the effectiveness of government
offensive actions.

4.5 Model Series 5
Model series 5 combines the terrorist daily activities model (model series 2) and
the terrorist significant event model (model series 4). Six iterations were used to develop
model series 5 into the final model. The primary reason for these iterations was correct
errors previously identified. The primary errors that were addressed included an
inappropriate iteration time difference (DT), the consolidation of the separate positive
and negative political will variables, the redefinition of the mechanistic event execution
outflow variable, the redefinition of the government decrease in spending outflow
variable, and other minor model changes required by the merger of the two model series.
4.5.1 Model 5A. Model 5A combined the final models from model series 2 and
model series 4. Model 5A1, shown in 33, changed the DT from 1 to 0.1, which
significantly smoothed out the appearance of the simulation output as shown in Figure
34. When compared with Figure 35, the pattern of behavior did not significantly change
from model 5A. The major change in model 5A1 was the introduction of the terrorist
daily activity (TDA) sector. As previously discussed, the development of the TSE sector
in model series 4 identified the need to represent the original TDA terrorist operations
variables as five separate variables with five corresponding parameters to identify the
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Figure 33. Stella ® Model 5A1

percent of terrorist spending earmarked for each variable. This gave the TDA sector of
the model 11 endogenous model variables and 11 exogenous model parameters. The
primary variables for the TDA sector are the terrorist daily expenditures stock and its two
associated flows, terrorist spending increase and terrorist spending decrease. The level of
the stock drives six of the other variables in this section which represent how the
terrorists spend their money. Those variables are terrorist logistics, terrorist training,
terrorist planning, terrorist intelligence, terrorist defensive actions, and terrorist daily
operations. Each of these variables has an associated model parameter, identified as a
coefficient, which identifies what percent of the total terrorist daily spending is spent on
the activity. The terrorist intelligence and terrorist defensive actions have been defined as
graphical variables and will be discussed in Section 4.6.
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Figure 34. Model 5A Output Using a DT of 1
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Figure 35. Model 5A1 Output Using a DT of 0.1

Terrorist logistics, training, and planning are all activities that drive the terrorist
significant event activities. Since these activities have the same amplification factor,
there is no inherent benefit to have three separate variables. However when future
research better defines these amplification factors with real world data, there will be an
added benefit to having these three activities disaggregated in the model. The terrorist
daily operations variable covers all other terrorist activities that impact the government
and are not related to the TSE sector of the model. These can include small scale attacks,
normal organizational maintenance, etc. While these actions may or may not directly
target the government, the government’s visibility of these actions will cause a
government response. These daily operations are combined with terrorist intelligence
and a general terrorist amplification factor to create the terrorist effectiveness variable,

113

which is combined with the TSE impact variable to create the total terrorist impact. This
total terrorist impact is a driver in how the government increases spending.
The behavior for model 5A1 was shown in Figure 35. As seen in the graph, all
three stocks reach a steady-state condition by day 45; more importantly, the event
execution never happens. Despite changing the parameters several times, the simulation
never produced a TSE event execution. Therefore, the event execution outflow was
redesigned and included as part of model 5C.
4.5.2 Model 5B. Model 5B created a single variable for political will and applied
a smoothing function to account for trends in behavior over a 30-day time period. This
means that the political will reacts to the 30-day trend of TSE impact change. The
change in model structure can be seen by comparing the government sector in Figure 33
with the government sector of Figure 36 in Section 4.5.4. However, since the model still
does not execute a TSE event, the TSE impact value is zero and, therefore, the political
will is zero. If the TSE trend variable, which is based on the TSE impact variable, is of
large enough magnitude, the political will of the nation will cause an increase or decrease
in government spending to match that trend. Model 5B also made a small correction to
the terrorist visibility variable. The terrorist visibility function was expanded to include a
terrorist daily activity stock term. The justification for this change was that terrorist
visibility is based on all terrorist activity and not just TSE activity.
4.5.3 Model 5C. Model 5C addresses the need to make the mechanistic outflow
more realistic by incorporating a smoothing function and a variable to monitor the firstorder derivative of the smoothing function. The theory is that if the terrorist leadership
saw zero or negative growth in their significant event activities, they would execute their

114

attack early before losing their stockpiled assets. The basic design for this new outflow is
to empty the entire TSE stock at once if the stock reaches the goal or if the stock trend
takes on a negative growth rate (i.e. signifying a loss of stockpiled assets). This function
operates on 4 variables (SE resource, outflow rate, SE resource trend slope, and SE
resource trend) and two parameters (goal and SE resource trend interval). This new
outflow corrected the previous problem. However, after model 5C was developed and
tested, it was recognized that it did not adequately describe the system behavior. For
instance, the terrorist significant event stock was not refilling as expected and the
government expenditures were growing at an exponential rate beyond what the U.S.
government was capable of spending.
4.5.4 Model 5D. Model 5D corrected the shortcomings of model 5C. The most
obvious error was that the primary inflow variables going from terrorist daily activities to
terrorist significant events did not have any kind of conversion factor. If a terrorist group
trains an individual in how to make bombs or how to fire a weapon, the inherent value of
that training is greater than the costs directly associated with the training itself. Similarly,
the overall value of those assets will be greater (or less) than the actual value for which
they were purchased. Based on these assumptions, amplification factors (parameters)
were added to terrorist training, planning, and logistics.
Another error was that there were no limits on the U.S. government’s capability
for spending on counterterrorism efforts. Utilizing the same method used to simulate the
outflow for the terrorist significant event stock, a smoothing function was set up for the
daily government expenditures stock with a variable monitoring the derivative of the
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trend slope. If the government daily spending trend exceeds some parameterized
threshold amount, an elevated, or threshold pressure, is applied to control the spending.
Model 5D also provided additional modifications to the political will variable so
that negative political will was possible if there was a significant decrease in terrorist
activity over an extended period of time. This change simply required separate
calculations for the magnitude and direction of political will. The equations for model
5D and the model data used during the simulations can be found in Appendix C. Figure
36 shows the final model structure, and Figure 37 shows the initial simulation output of
the final model.
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Figure 36. Stella® Model 5D Final
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4

4.6 Final Model Parameters
The values currently used in the final model are educated guesses that have not
been rigorously justified. The final model parameters have been divided into three
categories: model assumptions, fixed parameters, and estimated parameters.
4.6.1 Model Assumptions. The final model has 16 model parameters that are
based on assumptions, which are summarized in Tables 4 and 5. These 16 model
assumptions are broken up into two categories: 11 terrorist assumptions and 5
government assumptions. These two categories are explored in sections 4.6.1.1 and
4.6.1.2, respectively. Many of these assumptions will be discussed further in Chapter 5
as areas for future research.
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Table 4. Summary of Model Parameters – Terrorist Assumptions
Model Parameter

Model
Section
DTA

Value

Basic Assumption

$0/day

DTA

50%

Loss Rate

DTA

1%

Minimum Growth

DTA

$10/day2

Terrorist Logistics
Amplification Factor
Terrorist Planning
Amplification Factor
Terrorist Training
Amplification Factor
Terrorist
Amplification Factor

DTA

100

DTA

100

DTA

100

DTA

100

Significant Event
Resource
Expenditures
Momentum

TSE

$0/day

TSE

50%

Initial Flow Rate

TSE

$1/day

When the terrorist organization is
created they have no stockpiled assets
A terrorist organization over its lifespan
averages 50% growth on their
stockpiled assets after they start
stockpiling them
A terrorist organization wastes 1% of
their assets
A terrorist group raises at minimum
$10/day2
A terrorist group averages $100 of value
from every $1 spent on logistics
A terrorist group averages $100 of value
from every $1 spent on planning
A terrorist group averages $100 of value
from every $1 spent on training
A terrorist group averages $100 of value
from every $1 spent on daily operational
related activities
When the terrorist organization initiates
a terrorist action they have no stockpiled
assets
The act of stockpiling assets for an
attack has an associated 50%
momentum that increases the terrorists
ability to collect additional assets
Inherently, the terrorist has a need to
attack. This need is represented by the
$1/day2 initial and constant flow rate

Terrorist Daily
Expenditures
Growth
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Table 5. Summary of Model Parameters – Government Assumptions
Model Parameter

Model
Section
Government

Value

Basic Assumption

$0/day

Impact Coefficient

Government

10,000

Maintenance

Government

1%

Threshold Pressure

Government

50%

Normal Pressure

Government

10%

Initially Government does not
spend money to fight terrorism
unless there is a need
When a terrorist group initiates a
terrorist attack they get $10,000
of damage for every $1 spent on
the attack
Once the Government starts
spending money on something
there is a constant 1% inflow
required to maintain those actions
If the government spending to
fight terrorism exceeds the
threshold of acceptable spending
Congress will reduce the
spending by half
On any given day Congress wants
to spend 10% of the
counterterrorism funding on their
unrelated pet project

Government Daily
Expenditures

4.6.1.1 Terrorist Assumptions. This study made assumptions about the stock,
growth, and amplification. The simplest of these assumptions are the stock assumptions.
It was assumed that the terrorists do not initially have any assets and that they must
acquire all required assets. These assets are measured by how much the terrorist spends
to acquire and/or to train the asset. It is assumed that both the terrorist daily expenditures
stock and the significant event resource expenditures stock both start at $0/day and $0,
respectively.
The growth assumptions are necessary since this study does not model terrorist
fundraising activities. As with most investments, it was assumed that the terrorists
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benefit from some type of growth or momentum associated with the acquisition of assets.
In the TDA sector of the model, the growth parameter was associated with an increase in
daily terrorist expenditures. It was assumed that the terrorist organization generates a
flow each day that is equal to 50% of its current stockpiled assets. Because of this and
the assumption that the initial stock value is zero, a minimum growth or minimum
fundraising amount had to be identified to initiate the terrorist activity. This was
assumed to be $10/day2. Opposite of growth, a loss rate was identified for the daily
terrorist expenditures outflow; it was assumed that terrorists waste one percent of their
stockpiled assets. In the TSE sector, momentum was assumed to be 50%; in other words,
for every $2 worth of assets currently stockpiled, $1 worth of new assets were generated.
A flow rate of $1/day was initially added to the model to initiate the process of
accumulating assets for an attack. However, as identified earlier, it is no longer required
for the model and can be dropped in later research.
The amplification factor assumptions have to do with the gained value provided
by an activity. For example, if the amplification factor was $10, the organization would
gain $10 in value for every $1 spent on that activity. The final model has four
amplifications factors associated with the daily activities of terrorists: terrorist logistics
amplification factor (TL Amp Factor), terrorist planning amplification factor (TP Amp
Factor), terrorist training amplification factor (TT Amp Factor), and terrorist
amplification factor. Terrorist logistics, planning, and training were identified as primary
TDA variables associated with the TSE activities of the terrorist organizations. All four
of the terrorist amplification factors were arbitrarily assumed to be 100.
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4.6.1.2 Government Assumptions. There are five government assumptions:
government daily expenditure, impact coefficient, maintenance, threshold pressure, and
normal pressure. The government daily expenditure stock was initially set to zero for the
same reason that the two terrorist stocks were set to zero. The assumption is that the
government did not have inherent counterterrorism assets identified to address the
problem and that they had to relocate the required assets from other government activities
or procure them. Another similarity to the terrorist side of the model is the impact
coefficient, which is similar to the terrorist amplification factors. The impact coefficient
is a conversion factor that changes the dollars spent by the terrorist group on a TSE attack
into the amount of damage inflicted on the target of the attack. This value is assumed to
be 10,000. For every $1 spent on the attack by the terrorist group, $10,000 of damage is
inflicted on the target. The maintenance parameter is a growth assumption based on the
government’s requirement to maintain their organizations and facilities. This parameter
was assumed to be 1% of the current stock.
The last two parameters are political pressures associated with the government
outflow. The threshold pressure represents a higher political pressure to control
government spending that exceeds the threshold value. It was assumed that the threshold
pressure was 50%; in other words, politicians diverted half of the governments
counterterrorism spending to other government programs because of out of control
spending. The normal pressure parameter represents the daily pressure from Congress to
spend money on things other than counterterrorism. It was assumed that normally 10%
of all government counterterrorism spending was being diverted to other government
activities.
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4.6.2 Fixed Parameters. There are four fixed parameters, three of which
are trend intervals. Table 6 gives an overall summary of these fixed parameters and
justification for their values. Trend intervals are parameters required by Stella® to
identify the time units used in evaluating the trend of the variable of interest. The SE
resource (SER) trend interval is the number of days that terrorist leaders want to look
back to evaluate their stockpiling of resources in the preparation for a TSE attack. Since
TSE decisions are concerned with short term decisions, the interval was set at 2 days.
This parameter is primarily concerned with how soon after the government starts to drain
off stockpiled TSE resources are the terrorists going to execute the TSE event before all
assets are lost.

Table 6. Summary of Model Parameters – Fixed
Model Parameter
SER Trend Interval

Model Section
TSE

Value
2 days

Government Trend
Interval

Government

30 days

Threshold

Government

$1 billion/day

Terrorist Significant
Event Interval

Government

30 day
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Justification
Did they do better or
worse today than
yesterday
Government operates on
monthly, quarterly, and
yearly data. This model
utilizes monthly.
In 2002 the U.S.
Government outlay for
National Defense was just
shy of $1 billion/day
Government operates on
monthly, quarterly, and
yearly data. This model
utilizes monthly.

The other two trend intervals, the government trend interval and the TSE interval,
are related to governmental decisions. The government trend interval is used to decide if
the government is spending too much on terrorism instead of other government agendas.
The TSE interval is used to calculate the political will of the nation towards terrorism.
Since the government normally operates on a monthly, quarterly, or yearly basis with its
decision statistics, the interval for both parameters was fixed at 30 days. Quarterly or
yearly trend analysis would make more sense if the model run time was greater than 1
year.
The threshold parameter is the point at which the political pressure to spend
government money on other things significantly increases. For this model, the threshold
was set at $1 billion/day for a 30-day trend. This was based on the $348,555 million in
government outlays spent on national defense for 2002 (Office of Management and
Budget, 2003:51).
4.6.3 Estimated Parameters and Sensitivity Analysis. As previously
mentioned, the final model has 11 estimated parameters; except for the terrorist
significant event sector, these parameters are based on percentages of activity or spending
per day. Stella® was used to check the sensitivity of these parameters for three of the
model’s major decision points for system managers: government action, terrorist
spending, and government spending. Table 7 summarizes the estimated parameters along
with their model sector, their expected range, and their set value used for the sensitivity
analysis of the other two parameter groups. As discussed in the following sections, the
model demonstrated sensitivity to variations in each of the three parameter groups.
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Table 7. Summary of Model Parameters – Estimated
Model Parameter
TDA Percent of
Government Action
SE Percent of
Government Action
Terrorist Defensive
Actions Coefficient
Terrorist Daily
Operations Coefficient
Terrorist Intelligence
Coefficient
Terrorist Logistics
Coefficient
Terrorist Planning
Coefficient
Terrorist Training
Coefficient
Goal
Government
Counterterrorism
Operations Coefficient
Government Defense
Coefficient
Government
Intelligence
Coefficient

Model
Sector
TDA

Expected
Range
10-90%

TSE

10-90%

TDA

10-50%

TDA

10-50%

TDA

10-50%

TDA

10-50%

TDA

10-50%

TDA

10-50%

TSE
Government

1000-1000000
10-80%

Government

10-80%

Government

10-80%

Value in Analysis of other
Parameters
Linked with SE Coeff.
Otherwise 50%
Linked with SDE Coeff.
Otherwise 50%
Linked to Terrorist Coeffs
Otherwise 10%
Linked to Terrorist Coeffs
Otherwise 10%
Linked to Terrorist Coeffs
Otherwise 15%
Linked to Terrorist Coeffs
Otherwise 15%
Linked to Terrorist Coeffs
Otherwise 25%
Linked to Terrorist Coeffs
Otherwise 25%
10000
Linked to Gov’t Coeff.
Otherwise 60%
Linked to Terrorist Coeff.
Otherwise 25%
Linked to Terrorist Coeff.
Otherwise 15%

4.6.3.1 Government Action Decision. The government action consists of the
following parameters: TDA Percent of Government Action and SE Percent of
Government Action. These parameters target a percentage of the total amount of
government action towards terrorist daily expenditures or terrorist significant event
resources, respectively. Because these parameters measure a percentage of the same
activity, their sum must equal 1.0. If parameter values are in increments of 10, Table 8
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provides the values used for both parameters as part of the sensitivity analysis. The
results are shown in Figures 38, 39, and 40 for each of the model stocks.

Table 8. Sensitivity Settings for the Government Action Parameter Group
Run
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

SDE Percent of
Government Action
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90

SE Percent of
Government Action
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
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Total
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
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Figure 38. Government Daily Expenditures Sensitivity to Government Action Parameter Group
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Figure 39. Terrorist Daily Expenditures Sensitivity to Government Action Parameter Group
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Figure 40. Significant Event Resource Sensitivity to Government Action Parameter Group

Of the nine sets of parameter values shown in Table 8, only two runs result in
significant behavioral changes to the simulation output: run 1 and run 2. According to
these two runs, the modeled system as currently defined reaches steady-state behavior
when 80 percent or more of the total government actions focus on the terrorist significant
event sector of the model. As indicated in Figures 38 through 40, the remaining sets of
parameter values demonstrate an oscillating behavior with variations in the amplitude and
frequency of the oscillations.
4.6.3.2 Terrorist Spending Decision. With six parameters in this section, this was
the most complicated sensitivity analysis of the model. The six parameters involved were
the terrorist defensive action (TDA) coefficient, terrorist daily operations (TDO)
coefficient, terrorist intelligence (TI) coefficient, terrorist logistics (TL) coefficient,
terrorist planning (TP) coefficient, and terrorist training (TT) coefficient. These
parameters measure what percentage of the terrorist activity is spent in each area;
therefore, the sum of all six variables must equal 1.0. A key assumption for this section
was that each parameter would have a minimum value of 0.10, assuming that each
activity would represent at least 10 percent of the terrorist’s total daily activity. Because
many of the parameters have not been justified with real-world data, the sensitivity
analysis was limited to the values shown in Table 9 as an example of the possibilities.
The results for these seven combinations are illustrated in Figures 41, 42, and 43. As the
figures indicate, the seven combinations are similar, with significant differences only in
the amplitude and frequency of the oscillations. Some of the results indicate such low
oscillation amplitudes after the initial spike that they are effectively zero. When the
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model parameters have been more robustly defined, the full scale sensitivity analysis can
be performed.

Table 9. Sensitivity Settings for the Terrorist Spending Parameter Group
Run

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

TDA
Coeff
%
50
10
10
10
10
10
16.67

TDO
Coeff
%
10
50
10
10
10
10
16.67

TI
Coeff
%
10
10
50
10
10
10
16.67

TL
Coeff
%
10
10
10
50
10
10
16.67
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TP
Coeff
%
10
10
10
10
50
10
16.67

TT
Coeff

Total

10
10
10
10
10
50
16.67
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100
100
100
100
100
100.02
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Figure 41. Government Daily Expenditures Sensitivity to Terrorist Spending Parameter Group
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Figure 42. Terrorist Daily Expenditures Sensitivity to Terrorist Spending Parameter Group
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Figure 43. Significant Event Resource Sensitivity to Terrorist Spending Parameter Group

4.6.3.3 Government Spending Decision. Government policy dictates how the
government spends its money. The parameters associated with government policy
include the government counterterrorism operations (GCTO) coefficient, the government
defense (GD) coefficient, and the government intelligence (GI) coefficient. GCTO refers
to offensive government actions against terrorist’s assets and activities, whereas GD
refers to active and passive defensive government actions implemented to protect
government assets from terrorist attack. As with the previous two groups of parameters,
the government spending parameters must sum to 1.0. The assumption was that each
activity would require at least 10 percent of the government’s total daily activity. Like
the terrorist spending sensitivity analysis, this sensitivity analysis was limited to the
values shown in Table 10 an example of the possibilities for government policy
decisions. The results for these nine combinations are shown in Figures 44, 45, and 46.
As the figures indicate, certain model parameters in this group have a rather large impact
on the system behavior. Most notable is the GTCO coefficient which significantly limits
model behavior when the GTCO is high.
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Table 10. Sensitivity Settings for the Government Spending Parameter Group
Run
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

GCTO Coeff
%
80
10
10
70
70
20
10
20
10

GD Coeff
%
10
80
10
20
10
70
70
10
20
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GI Coeff
%
10
10
80
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10
20
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70
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100
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Figure 44. Government Daily Expenditures Sensitivity to Government Spending Parameter Group
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Figure 45. Terrorist Daily Expenditures Sensitivity to Government Spending Parameter Group
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Figure 46. Significant Event Resource Sensitivity to Government Spending Parameter Group

4.6.4 Graphical Variables. The last section of this chapter explains the five
graphically defined variables shown in Figure 47: government intelligence, government
defense, terrorist intelligence, terrorist defense, and magnitude of political will. The data
points used to create the graphs for these variables are included in Appendix C. Except
for political will, the variables are similar in nature. Each one produces an efficiency
rating, ranging from 0 to 1, based on how much money is being spent on that variable by
the government or the terrorist. This efficiency rating is used by other variables in the
model to determine how much of a given action was effective. For example, suppose the
government spent $1 million/day in GCTO. However, the government intelligence
variable said that the government only knew 50 percent of what the terrorists were doing.
This would be represented by a rating of 0.5, which would indicate that only $0.5
million/day was spent. The other 50% of the money was wasted on useless actions.
Each of these four variables also have a defined upper and lower boundary; within
these bounds, their behavior follows an S-shaped curve. It is assumed that regardless of
how much is spent, one can never know or defend against everything; therefore, the
upper boundaries are 80 percent for the government and 90 percent for the terrorists. The
lower bounds are considered to be zero except for the two intelligence variables. It is
assumed that even if no money is spent on intelligence, media coverage will provide a
minimal level of intelligence; therefore, the lower bounds for terrorist and government
intelligence are 25 percent and 16.5 percent, respectively. The lower bounds for the
defensive variables were set at zero since one must take some kind of action to defend
against an enemy action.
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The fifth graphic variable, magnitude of political will, uses a step function to
determine the level of political will. The idea behind this variable is that the political will
of a nation is not linear. When the level of significant terrorist activity moves outside a
set range, government political will causes either an increase or decrease in government
spending to fight terrorism. This graphical variable calculates only the magnitude of
change in political will; the change in direction, i.e., increase or decrease, is determined
by the political will variable.

Figure 47. Graphic Variables
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V. Conclusions
This research showed the ability of system dynamics to help develop a
government policy towards terrorism that can directly affect a terrorist’s behavior. The
study had two objectives: (1) identify the primary interactions between terrorist
organizations and the government and (2) provide insight into how the terroristgovernment system behaves and what effects changes to the primary interactions have on
the overall system behavior. Even with some significant limitations, the final model
clearly demonstrates that there is a tremendous potential benefit to the government from
this line of research. As demonstrated by the sensitivity analysis of the government
parameters, the focusing of government action and the way the government spends its
money can directly affect the behavior of the terrorist organization. From that
perspective, this study identified more questions then it answered.

5.1 Objectives and Conclusions
5.1.1 Identifying the Primary Interactions. The study’s inductive system
dynamics approach and available literature on terrorism have established a final model of
terrorist–government interaction that identifies some very significant system interactions
between the three model sectors: terrorist daily activity, terrorist significant event, and
government. These significant system interactions are at an aggregated level of
government activity. These aggregated activities were supported with an intense
literature review of the subject matter.
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5.1.2 Basic Insight into the System Behavior and Primary System Drivers.
The final model shows the benefit of certain types of aggregated government interactions
with a terrorist organization that produce a more desired behavior for the overall system
based on the model parameters. The sensitivity analysis highlights how the primary
system interactions can drive the overall model behavior. This research effort is the
genesis of a future research stream capable of helping the government manage their
terrorism policy to produce the desired system behavior.
5.1.3 Conclusions. This study, even with its limitations, demonstrated that
system dynamics is capable of providing government policy makers with key insights
about how to approach terrorism from an aggregated level. It is clear that this current
model suggests a government policy that favors offensive action against a terrorist
organization. This supports the old axiom of human conflict that “the best defense is a
good offense.” There are real-world limitations that are currently part of this model that
need to be considered in future research; however, sponsorship from the right
governmental organizations and the proper access to data will produce a model that has
significant implications in how the government approaches terrorism at an aggregate
level.

5.2 Model Limitations
This model has several significant limitations that need to be addressed. These
primary limitations have been classified into three categories: level of detail, parameter
assessment, and general limitations. The level of detail limitation addresses the need or
potential need for greater detail in certain parts of the model. The parameter assessment
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focuses on the need for real-world data to parameterize the model. Finally, the general
assumptions identify key real-world limitations to this model and modeling process.
There are two primary limitations related to level of detail in this study. First, the
current model does not account for terrorist fundraising activities or government actions
to target these activities. Chapter II identified that since September 11, 2001, the U.S.
government has been leading an international effort to freeze known terrorist’s assets and
to cut of their funding sources. This demonstrates that the government considers terrorist
fundraising to be a key interaction driving the overall system behavior. The current
model needs to be expanded to test this belief.
The second limitation concerns the five graphical variables utilized within the
current model. Each of these variables could be further defined with system dynamic
structures on a sub-system level to better simulate the actual behavior produced by these
variables. The most likely of these five variables for additional level of detail is the
government variable for intelligence. The reason for this is the popular perception that
there is a distinct difference between electronic intelligence and human intelligence and
that the sub-system activity at this level will significantly affect the model.
The second limitation category is parameter analysis. This limitation is possibly
the most significant limitation to the current model and also probably the easiest
limitation to correct. This limited the study’s ability to get access to a terrorism expert or
to some of the terrorism databases, such as the ITERATE database which costs $50 per
year for access (Mickolus, 2002:160) or the RAND Chronology of International
Terrorism (Quillen, 2002b:300). If a sponsor, or funding in general, can be obtained to
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gain access to this real-world information, the already significant impact of the current
model can be increased dramatically.
The last limitation category addresses the general limitations that are part of the
underlying assumptions of this study. The largest of these limitations is that this study
deals only with one terrorist organization interacting with one government. In reality,
most nations interact with more than one terrorist organization and most terrorist
organizations interact with more than one government. However, at an aggregate level,
many of the insights gained by the study can still be applied.
The other major limitation in this category is that system dynamics focuses on
system behavior over time and not on trying to predict a system output for a given time.
Therefore, this model is not capable of predicting the exact time or location for a terrorist
attack. The current model does not incorporate a lot of terrorist decision making analysis
about how, what, when, or where to attack. Even with these limitations, the general
knowledge that is gained about the system behavior and how key elements of the system
affect that behavior has a significant value to government policy makers.

5.3 Future Research Possibilities
This study has proven that system dynamics has a distinct future in helping
government policy makers better understand the system behaviors driven by terrorist–
government interactions. This creates significant possibilities for future research: model
parameter justification, level of model detail, and spin-off research. However, this list of
future research is by no means all inclusive. The terrorism field of research is relatively
new to the U.S. academic community; however, the British and others have been
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studying terrorism for some time. The Studies in Conflict & Terrorism journal, available
on the electronic EBSCO research database, is an amazing source of research material for
this field of study.
5.3.1 Model Parameter Justification. Justification of model parameters is the
next logical step in this line of research. The data for the justification of these parameters
can be collected in another research effort or purchased if funding becomes available.
Additionally, the support of a terrorism expert would greatly help the justification effort
and the overall modeling effort. However, the researcher also needs to keep in mind,
“What question am I trying to answer, and what level of data do I need to get that
answer?”
5.3.2 Level of Model Detail. Some thought needs to be given to expanding the
level of detail for this model. As mentioned in earlier sections, the model currently has
no structure associated with terrorist fundraising efforts. Both Gunaratna (2002:60-62)
and Hoffman (2002:306-307) have credited Al Qaeda with having a sophisticated
financial system. Hoffman (1998:84) identifies that the Palestinian Liberation
Organization (PLO) is suspected to have had an annual income of around a half a billion
dollars in the mid-1980s from their financial system. These factors, combined with the
government’s focus on terrorist fundraising, justify expanding the level of detail in the
overall model to include terrorist fundraising.
Additional detail needs to be considered for the model’s graphic variables.
Overall, each of these variables could be removed and replaced with a sub-model to more
accurately model their effects on the overall model. The four S-shaped models could be
replaced with model structures similar to the early models developed in model series 4.
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The current model can still be accurate with the graphical variables, if they are properly
defined. The question is whether additional detail in this area of the model creates a
better simulation.
5.3.3 Spin-off Research. From the literature review in Chapter II, the most
interesting spin-off research possibility is how “lateral pressure” affects the motivation
and sponsorship of terrorist groups. Wils, Kamilya, and Choucri (1998) concluded that
the variables of “lateral pressure” theory create a number of reinforcing loops that can
make it difficult to halt the level of violence and conflict (Wils, Kamilya, and Choucri,
1998:155). They also conclude that “lateral pressure” is how a government acquires the
assets they need to maintain their current quality of life (Wils, Kamilya, and Choucri,
1998:155). So does the U.S. involvement in the Middle East in some way drive the
interactions between some terrorists groups and the U.S.?
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Appendix A. Model Series 2 Final Model: Model 2C
This appendix displays Model 2C in its entirety as developed using Stella® 6.0.
Model 2C was the final product of the series 2 modeling process and was one of two
starting points for the final model developed in model series 5.

A.1. Model 2C Interface Level
The interface level is too large to fit on one screen shoot so it is shown in Figures
48 and 49. Figure 48 shows the model settings for the simulation run, the graphical
variables and general comments on the model. Figure 49 shows the stock and flow
graphs generated by the model’s simulation run. The model run time is 365 days;
however the graphs have been produced for only the first 180 days.
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Figure 48. Model 2C Interface Level Screen Shot 1
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Figure 49. Model 2C Interface Level Screen Shot 2
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A.2. Model 2C Map/Model Level
The map/model level displays the Stella® model in graphical format, as shown in
Figure 50.

Figure 50. Model 2C Map/Model Level Screen Shot
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A.3. Model 2C Equation Level
The equation level displays the mathematical equations used by Stella® to
simulate the model, as shown in Figure 51.

Figure 51. Model 2C Equation Level Screen Shot
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Appendix B. Model Series 4 Final Model: Model 4K1
This appendix displays model 4K1 in its entirety as developed using Stella® 6.0.
Model 4K1 was the final product of the series 4 modeling process and was one of two
starting points for the final model developed in model series 5.

B.1. Model 4K1 Interface Level
The interface level is too large to fit on one screen shoot so it is shown in Figures
52 and 53. Figure 52 shows the model settings for the simulation run, the graphical
variables and general comments on the model. Figure 53 shows the stock and flow
graphs generated by the model’s simulation run. The model run time is 365 days;
however the graphs have been produced for only the first 180 days.
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Figure 52. Model 4K1 Interface Level Screen Shot 1
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Figure 53. Model 4K1 Interface Level Screen Shot 2
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B.2. Model 4K1 Map/Model Level
The map/model level displays the Stella® model in graphical format, as shown in
Figure 54.

Figure 54. Model 4K1 Map/Model Level Screen Shot

157

B.3. Model 4K1 Equation Level
The equation level displays the mathematical equations used by Stella® to
simulate the model, as shown in Figure 55 and 56.

Figure 55. Model 4K1 Equation Level Screen Shot 1
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Figure 56. Model 4K1 Equation Level Screen Shot 2
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Appendix C. Model Series 5 Final Model: Model 5D
This appendix displays model 5D, the final model, in its entirety as developed
using Stella® 6.0. Model 5D is a modified combination of models 2C and 4K1 and was
the final model for this research.

C.1. Model 5D Interface Level
The interface level is too large to fit on one screen shoot so it is shown in Figures
57 and 58. Figure 57 shows the model settings for the simulation run, the graphical
variables and general comments on the model. Figure 58 shows the stock and flow
graphs generated by the model’s simulation run. The model run time is 365 days;
however the graphs have been produced for only the first 180 days.
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Figure 57. Model 5D Interface Level Screen Shot 1
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Figure 58. Model 5D Interface Level Screen Shot 1

C.2. Model 5D Map/Model Level
The map/model level displays the Stella® model in graphical format, as shown in
Figure 59.

Figure 59. Model 4K1 Map/Model Level Screen Shot
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C.3. Model 5D Equation Level
The equation level displays the mathematical equations used by Stella® to
simulate the model, as shown in Figure 60, 61, and 62.

Figure 60. Model 5D Equation Level Screen Shot 1
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Figure 61. Model 5D Equation Level Screen Shot 2
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Figure 62. Model 5D Equation Level Screen Shot 3
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